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QUESTION PRESENTED
In the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), Congress provided a private right
of action to victims of child sex trafficking against those
who knowingly participate in the trafficking venture.
Massachusetts provides a similar cause of action
against those who “knowingly aid[]” such a venture.
Petitioners are child sex trafficking victims who were
trafficked through Backpage.com, which is owned and
operated by respondents. Petitioners sued respondents
under the TVPRA and its state analogue for their role
in promoting, facilitating, and aiding the trafficking of
petitioners. The First Circuit held that even if petitioners had plausibly alleged a cause of action under the
TVPRA and state law, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) made respondents “immune” from liability. Section 230(c)(1) provides that no
internet service provider “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker” of internet content that was “provided by another.” The First Circuit held that petitioners’
claims “treated” respondents as a “publisher or speaker” of “information provided by another” for purposes
of Section 230(c)(1) because online advertisements created by third-party traffickers were a “but-for” cause
of petitioners’ injuries. The question presented is:
Whether Section 230 of the CDA precludes a civil
lawsuit against a website owner and operator based on
its own criminal conduct any time online content created by a third party was a part of the chain of causation
leading to the plaintiff’s injuries.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane
Doe No. 3, Sam Loe, and Sara Loe were the plaintiffs in
the District Court and the appellants in the Court of
Appeals.
Respondents Backpage.com LLC, Camarillo Holdings, LLC, and New Times Media, LLC were the defendants in the District Court and the appellees in the
Court of Appeals.
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JANE DOE ET AL., PETITIONERS
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BACKPAGE.COM LLC, ET AL.
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FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane
Doe No. 3, Sam Loe, and Sara Loe respectfully petition
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App., infra,
1a-33a) is reported at 817 F.3d 12. The opinion of the
District Court granting respondents’ motion to dismiss
(App., infra, 34a-67a) is reported at 104 F. Supp. 3d 149.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals entered judgment on March
14, 2016. The court denied Doe’s timely petition for rehearing en banc on May 3, 2016. See App., infra, 68a(1)
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69a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutes are the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230; the Trafficking
Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. 1591 and 1595; and the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protection
Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50(d).
The relevant provisions of the statutes are reproduced in full in the appendix (App., infra, 70a-80a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition involves a statutory provision—
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA)—that Congress enacted in 1996 to protect internet service providers (ISPs) serving as passive intermediaries of online content from liability for claims
that treat them as a traditional publisher. 47 U.S.C.
230(c)(1). The First Circuit applied Section 230 to preclude petitioners’ claims alleging affirmative conduct by
an ISP itself that violated federal and state antitrafficking statutes, specifically the federal Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. 1591(a), and the Massachusetts
Anti-Trafficking Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 265, § 50(d).
Petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, under the
TVPRA and MATA alleging that respondents had
knowingly profited from aiding and participating with
traffickers in the sexual exploitation of children by in-
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tentionally creating an online marketplace to facilitate
the trafficking. App., infra, 35a-40a. The district court
granted respondents motion to dismiss, concluding that
Section 230 of the CDA barred petitioners’ claims under the TVPRA and MATA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, even assuming respondents directly violated the TVPRA and MATA, petitioners’ claims
under those statutes “treated” respondents “as a publisher” under Section 230(c)(1), because advertisements
that third-party traffickers created were part of the
chain of causation that led to petitioners’ injuries.
The First Circuit’s decision conflicts with several
decisions of the Ninth Circuit rejecting the “chain of
causation” principle adopted by the First Circuit. Additionally, the decision conflicts with a September 2015
decision of the Washington Supreme Court in a nearly
identical case brought against these same respondents.
Finally, the First Circuit disregards the guidance provided by this Court in POM Wonderful LLC v. CocaCola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014), and other cases about
the need to harmonize intersecting statutes.
A. Statutory Provisions
1. Section 230 of the CDA
Section 230 of the CDA provides that no ISP defendant “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker”
of Internet content that was “provided by another.” 47
U.S.C. 230(c)(1). Passed in 1996, the CDA represents
an effort by Congress to regulate access to indecent or
obscene content on the Internet. Congress was additionally motivated by the then-recent New York state
court decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
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1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d
1011, 1016 (2011). In Stratton Oakmont, an Internet
service provider was held liable for a third party’s libelous statements posted on a neutral message board.
Id. at *6-7. The court determined that, because the interactive computer service Prodigy sometimes “deleted
* * * distasteful third-party postings” that appeared on
Prodigy-owned bulletin boards, Prodigy was subject to
strict, common law “publisher’s liability” for defamatory content that any one of its millions of users might
choose to post on any one of Prodigy’s numerous online
bulletin boards. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d
1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009). Concerned that Stratton
Oakmont would deter ISPs from exercising any editorial control over potentially offensive third-party content, Congress passed Section 230 to remove traditional
publisher liability for ISPs who acted in good faith to
remove or restrict such content. See H.R. Rep. No.
458, at 194 (1996), 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (stating that
specific purpose of Section 230(c)(1) was to overrule
Stratton Oakmont); 141 Cong. Rec. 22044-22045 (1995)
(amendment offered by Rep. Cox). Senator Coats, one
of the two main authors of the CDA, made clear while
discussing Section 230 that its intention was to prevent
ISPs that try to keep offensive material off the Internet “from being held liable as a publisher for defamatory statements for which they would not otherwise have
been liable.” 141 Cong. Rec. S8345 (daily ed. June 14,
1995) (statement of Sen. Coats).
Given its historical context, courts have accepted
that the wording of Section 230(c)(1) has its roots in the
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common law of defamation, which “treats as publishers”
those who participate, either intentionally or negligently, in the communication of a defamatory matter to a
person other than the person defamed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 577, 581 (1977). In fact, early
decisions applying Section 230 generally arose out of
facts similar to those that inspired its passage. See,
e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Federal
courts have generally agreed, however, that Section
230 is not limited to defamation claims and “does more
than just overrule Stratton Oakmont.” Accusearch, 570
F.3d at 1195. In those instances where courts have
specifically interpreted the phrase “treat[] as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another,” they have concluded that it bars claims that seek to
impose liability solely on the basis of a website operator’s “exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
2. TVPRA
In 2000, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act. The statute represents a congressional
effort to criminalize conduct related to human trafficking. Reauthorized five times—in 2003,1 2005, 2008, 2011
and 2013—the TVPRA imposes severe penalties on any
person who, inter alia, knowingly engages in trafficking of children for the purposes of engaging in “a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(2). Significantly,
1

In 2003, Congress reauthorized the statute, which then became known as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act.
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since 2003, the TVPRA has included a civil enforcement
provision that allows victims to “bring a civil action
against the perpetrator in an appropriate district court
of the United States” and to “recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.” 18 U.S.C. 1595 (2003). The
TVPRA does not impose liability for “publishing” information.
In 2008, Congress amended the TVPRA to broaden
its reach. The Wilberforce Amendments expanded
criminal liability to anyone who “benefits, financially or
by receiving anything of value, from participation in
[the underlying sex trafficking] venture” that “provides
[or] obtains” a child for a commercial sex act either
knowingly or in “reckless disregard” of the fact that the
victim is a minor. 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and (2). The
statute’s private right of action was also expanded to
give victims, like petitioners, the right to pursue a civil
claim against any persons who “knowingly benefit[] financially * * * from participation in [the underlying sex
trafficking] venture.” See 18 U.S.C. 1595. This private
right of action provision makes clear that, to be civilly
liable for participating in a child sex trafficking venture, a defendant need not have been the “perpetrator”
of the trafficking. Ibid. (no longer requiring defendant
to be “perpetrator”).
The legislative history of the TVPRA confirms
Congress’ intention to expand the reach of the statute.
In explaining the need for its amendments, one senator
stated, “[I]t is our job to once again be a beacon of progress and hope and no longer allow one man to profit
from the suffering of another.” 153 Cong. Rec. H14098,
H14120 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007). About these expansive
amendments, then-Senator Biden stated that they “es-
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tablish[ed] some powerful new legal tools, including increasing the jurisdiction of the courts, enhancing penalties for trafficking offenses, punishing those who profit
from trafficked labor and ensuring restitution of forfeited assets to victims.” 154 Cong. Rec. S4798, S4799
(daily ed. May 22, 2008).
3. MATA
Passed in 2011, the MATA is an example of the sustained national effort to comprehensively address the
problem of human trafficking at the state level. See
generally Melissa Dess, Walking the Freedom Trail:
An Analysis of the Massachusetts Human Trafficking
Statute, 33 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 147, 151 (2013). Like
its federal analogue, the MATA not only includes criminal penalties, but also provides victims with a private
right of action. Under the MATA’s private right of action, a victim is entitled to sue not only the individuals
who forced her to engage in commercial sex, but also
“[a]ny business entity that knowingly aid[ed] * * * [the]
joint venture[]” that trafficked her “for sexual servitude.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265 § 50(d).
B. Respondents’ Participation In Child Sex
Trafficking
Respondents own and operate Backpage.com, a
website that hosts more than 80 percent of the online
advertising for illegal commercial sex in the United
States. Each day, several hundred thousand advertisements are posted on the “Escorts” section of Backpage.com. Respondents charge money for the “Escort”
advertisements, reaping more than one million dollars
in profits annually from them. A significant portion of
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the advertisements on Backpage.com features children
that sex traffickers hold out for sale.
As petitioners alleged in their complaint, respondents are not merely passively aware that illegal commercial sex ventures operate over Backpage.com. Rather, respondents have engaged in affirmative conduct
designed to support such ventures (including those that
exploit children). Petitioners’ complaint alleged, among
other things, that respondents (1) steer traffickers toward advertising language that will avoid law enforcement detection; (2) accept and indeed encourage nontraditional payment methods that render virtually untraceable the financial transactions between respondents and the traffickers that advertise their victims
over Backpage.com; (3) strip metadata, including geolocation information, from photographs that traffickers
upload to Backpage.com to entice potential customers,
which hinders law enforcement’s ability to locate victims and apprehend their traffickers; (4) intentionally
delete from Backpage.com “sting ads” that law enforcement places on Backpage.com, which aids trafficking ventures’ profitability by eliminating a potential
customer deterrent; (5) host and facilitate private
communications between traffickers and customers regarding illegal sex transactions; and (6) feign cooperation with law enforcement while refusing to use techniques that could identify and locate children being sold
2
for sex. App., infra, 4a-7a. Respondents take all of
2

The plausibility of Plaintiffs’ allegations of criminal wrongdoing are supported by developments in the ongoing investigation
of Backpage.com by the U.S. Senate, including the preliminary
conclusions of subcommittee staff, the assertion by the Backpage.com CEO and two of its employees of their Fifth Amendment
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these actions in pursuit of their own profit; if the underlying sex trafficking ventures flourish, the traffickers
will post more advertisements on Backpage.com and be
willing to pay more to post them, which directly translates into more advertising dollars for respondents.
C. The Present Litigation
1. Petitioners
Beginnings at age 15, petitioners were illegally
trafficked for sex through Backpage.com. Jane Doe No.
1 was trafficked across Massachusetts and Rhode Island on Backpage.com in 2012 and 2013. She was sold
and raped 10-12 times per day by men responding to
the advertisements. Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked
across Massachusetts on Backpage.com from 2010
through 2012. She was advertised an average of 6
times per day and was sold and raped by 5 to 15 customers a day. Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage.com in 2013. She was driven to a hotel in Massachusetts, where she was raped in exchange for payment
that went to her trafficker. As a direct result of these
sex trafficking ventures, petitioners have suffered severe physical and psychological injuries.
In order to hold respondents responsible for their
conduct and the injuries that conduct caused, petitionprivilege against self-incrimination, and the determination by the
Senate to hold Backpage.com’s CEO in contempt. See Staff of S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 114th Cong., Recommendation to Enforce a Subpoena Issued to the CEO of Backpage.com,
LLC 1, 10, 30-33 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov
/subcommittees/investigations/reports; see also Application to Enforce Subpoena, Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations v.
Ferrer, No. 1:16-mc-621 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2016).
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ers filed a civil action against respondents in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Petitioners’ complaint included causes of action under
the TVPRA and the MATA. Petitioners’ complaint included detailed factual allegations about respondents’
own knowing, purposeful business conduct that is designed to and does solicit, encourage, promote, and protect the sex trafficking ventures that serve as an engine of Backpage.com’s profitability.
2. The District Court and First Circuit Proceedings
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners’ complaint, arguing that Section 230 of the CDA provided
them immunity from civil liability. Respondents argued that, because third-party traffickers were the
ones who authored and posted the advertisements that
shopped petitioners to potential customers, petitioners’
lawsuit “treated” respondents “as the publisher or
speaker” of “information provided by another” and was
therefore barred by Section 230. The district court
agreed with respondents and dismissed petitioners’
lawsuit. App., infra, 67a.
Petitioners timely appealed. On March 14, 2016,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel
acknowledged that the CDA and TVPRA “do not fit
together seamlessly, and this case reflects the tension
between them.” App., infra, 3a. The court wrote that
Congress enacted the CDA, in part, in response to
court cases that had held internet publishers liable for
defamatory content posted by third parties on the publishers’ message boards. Still, it concluded that there
had been “near-universal agreement” that the CDA
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should not be construed “grudgingly” and to do otherwise could have a “chilling effect.” Id. at 10a.
The First Circuit found that petitioners’ complaint
made a “persuasive case” that respondents purposefully tailored Backpage.com to “make sex trafficking easier.” App. infra, 32a-33a. The First Circuit concluded,
however, that even if petitioners’ complaint plausibly
alleged that respondents had violated the federal and
state criminal anti-trafficking laws, petitioners’ causes
of action “treated” respondents as the “publisher or
speaker” of online advertisements that third-party traffickers created, and therefore those claims were barred
by Section 230(c)(1). Id. at 11a-15a. The court explained that the advertisements that petitioners’ traffickers posted on Backpage.com were what provided a
connection between respondents’ own violations of the
federal and state anti-trafficking statutes on the one
hand and petitioners’ injuries on the other. In other
words, “information provided by another” linked the
chain of causation that led to petitioners’ injuries. This,
the First Circuit reasoned, was sufficient to trigger
Section 230(c)(1)’s bar. Id. at 11a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The First Circuit’s decision immunizes website
owners and operators, such as respondents, from civil
liability whenever online content created by a third
party was a part of the chain of causation leading to the
plaintiff’s injury—even if there are plausible allegations
that the website owner and operator’s own criminal
conduct contributed to her injury. The First Circuit’s
broad construction of Section 230 conflicts with several
decisions of the Ninth Circuit that expressly reject the
reasoning of the First Circuit, as well as with decisions
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of other circuits which align with the Ninth Circuit in
carefully confining the CDA to “neutral intermediaries.” The First Circuit’s decision also directly conflicts
with a September 2015 decision of the Washington Supreme Court in a case involving a nearly identical set of
facts that a nearly identical set of plaintiffs brought
against these same respondents.
The conflict between the First Circuit and these
other courts follows from a failure to attempt to harmonize the CDA with the criminal statutes underling petitioners’ claims. The consequence is that the federal and
state trafficking statutes have been effectively set
aside without any effort to determine whether Congress intended that the CDA would undermine its own
anti-trafficking efforts in that manner. More careful
analysis of the language and context of each statute
demonstrates that they can operate together in a manner that fulfills the important purposes of each.
This petition represents an ideal vehicle for this
Court to address Section 230 of the CDA and to provide
the lower courts guidance on how to construe and apply
this provision. First, the court of appeals held below
that Section 230 barred petitioners’ lawsuit against respondents, even assuming that petitioners’ complaint
stated a plausible claim that respondents have engaged
in purposeful and knowing conduct that violates federal
and state criminal anti-trafficking laws that include
private rights of action. The court of appeals’ construction and application of Section 230 was therefore outcome determinative of petitioners’ appeal. Second, the
stakes here are high. The gravamen of petitioners’
complaint is that respondents violated federal and state
criminal law—namely, the TVPRA and the MATA.
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Congress and the Massachusetts legislature each determined that, in addition to criminal penalties, private
rights of action are an essential part of the antitrafficking enforcement scheme. The First Circuit’s
decision strips petitioners of their right to hold respondents civilly liable for the injuries that their criminal conduct caused, and thereby impairs the enforcement scheme that Congress and the Massachusetts legislature so carefully crafted.
I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S BROAD CONSTRUCTION
OF CDA I MMUNITY C ONFLICTS W ITH O THER
COURTS AND WITH GUIDANCE FROM THIS
COURT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERSECTING S TATUTES
A. The First Circuit’s Broad Reading Of The
CDA Conflicts With The More Limited Construction Given It By Other Courts
1. The Ninth Circuit Rejects the First Circuit’s “causation” construction of the
CDA
The Ninth Circuit, which has the most developed
jurisprudence concerning Section 230, construes that
provision far more narrowly than the First Circuit
does. In particular, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the First Circuit’s view that the mere presence
of third-party content in the chain of causation leading
to a plaintiff’s injury necessarily triggers Section 230.
In stark contrast to the First Circuit’s approach, the
Ninth Circuit has instead looked beyond the presence
of third-party content to the particular nature of the
claims at issue to determine whether Section 230 applies. Other courts of appeals have agreed with the
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Ninth Circuit that liability can lie against an ISP that
acts as more than a mere passive intermediary, even
where third-party content played some role in the alleged injury.
In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the
Ninth Circuit held that a website operator could be
held liable for its own conduct that violated a “law[] of
general applicability.” 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (2008).
The court explained that, “even if the [challenged] information originated with a user,” the party “responsible for putting [that] information online may be subject
to liability” if, in the process of doing so, the ISP’s own
conduct makes it “more than a passive transmitter of
information provided by others.” Id. at 1165-1166. The
court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ allegations sought
to hold Roommates.com liable for its “own acts,” which
were “entirely its doing.” Id. at 1165. In other words,
the fact that third-party content appeared in the chain
of causation did not decide the matter. If the result
were otherwise, the Ninth Circuit noted, such an interpretation of Section 230 would stray far beyond congressional intent: “The Communications Decency Act
was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the
Internet.” Id. at 1164.
The next year, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit concluded that a defendant could not rely on
Section 230 to defend against a promissory estoppel
claim where the defendant had promised the plaintiff
that it would remove certain third-party content from
its website but then failed to do so. See 570 F.3d 1096,
1099, 1107-1109 (2009). The promissory estoppel claim,
the court explained, did not “seek to hold Yahoo liable
as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.” Id. at
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1107. That is, the claim was not based on Yahoo acting
as a passive intermediary, nor did it seek to impute the
content of the third-party speech to Yahoo. Rather, the
claim alleged that Yahoo had acted “as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has breached.”
Ibid. Even though the plaintiff would not have suffered
injury but for the third party’s original act of posting
the content, the court held that this fact did not bar the
plaintiff’s claim. Instead, what mattered was that the
claim sought to hold the ISP liable for its own conduct
in violation of contract law.
Most recently, in Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet
Brands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the reasoning of Roommates.com and Barnes by explicitly holding
that a claim was not barred by Section 230 simply because publication of third-party content on a website
was part of the chain of causation leading to the injury.
See 824 F.3d 846, 848, 853 (2016) (decision on rehearing). The plaintiff in Internet Brands alleged that the
defendant website knew that two of the site’s users had
been engaging in a scheme to lure, drug, and rape
women by responding to postings on the site; the plaintiff claimed that the site’s operators had tortiously
failed to warn the plaintiff and others like her about the
risk of being victimized. Id. at 848-849. Unlike the
First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit explained that, although the defendant “acted as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of user content * * * and that action could be described as a ‘but-for’ cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries * * *
that does not mean the failure to warn claim seeks to
hold [defendant] liable as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of
user content.” Id. at 853. The court reaffirmed
Barnes’s holding that “the CDA does not provide a
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general immunity against all claims derived from thirdparty content.” Ibid. And it further recognized that
any concern about a “chilling effect” on Internet
speech—such as the First Circuit expressed here,
(App., infra, 10a)—is inapplicable in a situation like
this: “Congress has not provided an all purpose get-outof-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content
on the internet, though any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on internet publishing businesses.”
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.
The lynchpin of these decisions is the understanding that Section 230, which was designed to protect
ISPs in their capacity as “neutral intermediaries,” does
not immunize a defendant from its own alleged violations of “laws of general applicability.”
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15. The court emphasized that the internet “is no longer a fragile new means
of communication that could easily be smothered in the
cradle,” but rather “a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is conducted.”
Id. at 1164 n.15. In that context, courts must not “exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress”
by “giv[ing] online businesses an unfair advantage over
their real-world counterparts,” who have to obey the
same laws as everyone else, ibid.—including laws prohibiting participation in child sex trafficking ventures.
If a business operator in the brick-and-mortar world
had created a marketplace for illegal sex with children,
assisted child sex traffickers in connecting with their
“customers,” and shielded those traffickers from law
enforcement scrutiny—in other words, if it had done
exactly what petitioners allege that respondents have
done—that business would be subject to civil liability in
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the Ninth Circuit for its participation in child sex trafficking. But not so in the First Circuit.
2. Other circuits agree that Section 230 is
limited to protection of ISPs serving as
“neutral intermediaries”
Other courts of appeals have agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that Section 230 must have limits, in order to
avoid turning the internet into the “lawless no-man’s
land” that the Roommates.com court warned against.
521 F.3d at 1164; FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d
1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Accusearch’s actions were
not ‘neutral’ with respect to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to generate such content. Accusearch is not entitled to immunity under the CDA.”); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551
F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to adopt district
court’s interpretation of Section 230, “which would read
[that section] more broadly than any previous Court of
Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating all
state- or common-law causes of action brought against
interactive Internet services”); Chicago Lawyers’
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Section 230(c) “as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators
and other online content hosts”).
Accordingly, the federal courts of appeal are broadly aligned on the principle that Section 230 protects
neutral intermediaries, not ISPs that, through their
3
own acts, have committed a wrong against a plaintiff.
3

See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (a website is immune pursuant to Section 230 if it “mere-
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This principle is particularly strong where the ISP’s
affirmative conduct is itself against the law. Both the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that Section 230 does not apply to non-neutral ISPs engaged in
misconduct that violates federal statutes. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198-99 (Section 230 did not apply
where the ISP contributed to the unlawful conduct of
its users in violation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166 (ISP was
“much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others,” and was therefore liable under
Section 230, where it required users to disclose illicit
preferences that violated the Fair Housing Act).
Unlike these other circuits, the First Circuit
adopted a “but-for” causation test that does not limit its
application to passive intermediaries. The First Circuit
goes far beyond those other courts to deem a plaintiff’s
cause of action to “treat[]” the defendant “as the publisher or speaker” of third-party content, and to be
barred by Section 230(c)(1), wherever “there would
[have been] no harm” to the plaintiff “but for [the thirdparty] content.” App., infra, 12a.
ly provides a neutral means by which third parties can post information of their own independent choosing online”); Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an ISP was
entitled to Section 230 immunity where its conduct was “passive”);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding that an ISP was a neutral intermediary entitled to
Section 230 protection because it did not contribute to the “underlying misinformation”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-986 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that an ISP was
a neutral intermediary entitled to Section 230 protection because it
did nothing to encourage the offensive content), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 824 (2000).
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Yet petitioners’ claims under the TVPRA and the
MATA do not “treat” respondents “as a publisher” at
all. Petitioners do not assert any claim that sounds in
defamation, or that resembles defamation despite being
asserted as a different cause of action. These claims do
not seek to impute another’s speech to Backpage.com.
See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478
F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007) (claim treated defendant as
a publisher because “any liability against [a defendant]
must be premised on imputing to it the alleged misinformation” written by message board users). Nor do
petitioners’ TVPRA and MATA claims seek to hold
Backpage.com liable for merely posting the advertisements, or for the act of communicating the advertisements. Compare, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (under plaintiff’s claims, an
ISP defendant would be “cast * * * in the same position
as the party who originally posted the offensive messages”). In other words, plaintiffs do not seek to impose liability because of Backpage.com’s role as an intermediary. Rather, petitioners seek to hold respondents liable for their own affirmative conduct—conduct
that ranged far beyond the “standard elements of web
sites ‘with both lawful and unlawful potential.’ ” Lycos,
478 F.3d at 421 (quoting MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)); see also J.S. v. Vill.
Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash.
2015) (en banc) (explaining that Backpage’s policies, designed to enable sex trafficking, are “not simply neutral
policies prohibiting or limiting certain content”).
The First Circuit’s interpretation of Section 230
would provide any website operator with an absolute
immunity from any civil claim for a limitless range of
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illegal conduct, provided solely that third party content
appears somewhere in the chain of causation leading to
the plaintiff’s injury. Any plaintiff bringing a claim
against a website operator in the First Circuit will
therefore face an insuperable barrier to overcoming a
motion to dismiss, whereas if that same claim were
brought in a district court in the Ninth Circuit, that
same plaintiff, with the same factual allegations and the
same claims, would have an opportunity to take discovery to prove her case.
3. The Washington Supreme Court rejected
a CDA defense to an identical claim to
Petitioners’
The conflict detailed above is not mere speculation—it has already occurred in a state court of last resort within the Ninth Circuit. In September 2015, the
Washington Supreme Court confronted a case with
nearly identical facts to those alleged here, brought by
similarly situated plaintiffs against the exact same defendants, advancing substantively similar claims. The
Washington Supreme Court, following the Ninth Circuit’s lead, allowed that case to proceed to discovery.
In J.S., as here, plaintiffs who had been trafficked
for sex on Backpage.com while they were minors
brought a complaint alleging that respondents had facilitated their sexual exploitation. 359 P.3d 714. J.S. and
her two co-plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs here, were raped
multiple times while minors by adults who responded to
Backpage.com advertisements. Id. at 716. J.S. brought
suit in Washington state court alleging violations of a
variety of state law claims, including sexual exploitation of children. Ibid.; see id. at 717 n.3. As here, respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that they were
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immune from liability under Section 230. Id. at 716.
And as here, the plaintiffs responded that respondents
were not protected from suit because their website was
“designed to help pimps develop advertisements that
can evade the unwanted attention of law enforcement,
while still conveying the illegal message”—specifically,
Backpage.com had intentionally structured its posting
requirements in a manner that it knew would allow and
encourage the trafficking of children for sex, and respondents’ supposed preventative measures were in
reality “a fraud and a ruse” designed to help Backpage.com and the traffickers who use it “evade law enforcement by giving the [false] appearance that Backpage.com does not allow sex trafficking on its website.”
Id. at 716, 717-718.
The state trial court in J.S. denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed to discovery. The defendant took an interlocutory appeal,
and in an en banc decision, the Washington Supreme
Court affirmed. 359 P.3d at 715-716. Relying on the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommates.com, the court
held that the plaintiffs’ allegations created a plausible
inference that respondents were not protected by Section 230 of the CDA: where plaintiffs offered plausible
allegations of participation in child sex trafficking,
those allegations, if proved, would demonstrate that
Backpage.com did more than passively “maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content,” as
the CDA required for protection from liability. Id. at
717. Under these circumstances, the court held that
discovery was necessary to “ascertain whether in fact
Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex traf-
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ficking,” because, if it had, the CDA would not provide
any protection. Ibid.
On almost identical allegations in the present case,
against the same defendants as in J.S., the First Circuit
held the opposite. In stark contrast to the Washington
court, the First Circuit failed to examine petitioners’
allegations of respondents’ participation in child sex
trafficking. Instead, the court of appeals assumed arguendo that plaintiffs had stated a claim under the
TVPRA’s private right of action yet did not treat that
as determinative. App., infra, 12a-14a. Quite the opposite—the First Circuit held that even if the petitioners
could show that respondents violated a criminal sex
trafficking statute, the pertinent question was whether
third-party content played any role in the causal chain
leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries. See ibid.
The court of appeals’ holding in the present case
creates a direct conflict with a state court of last resort.
It is plain that the Washington Supreme Court, following the Ninth Circuit’s lead, would have permitted petitioners’ claims to survive a motion to dismiss. Petitioners alleged the same conduct by the same defendants as
in the J.S. case, and they likewise sought to hold respondents liable for their participation in the sex trafficking of children based on this conduct. Yet, if J.S.
had brought her claim in a federal district court in the
First Circuit, that claim would not have survived a motion to dismiss. There is thus a fundamental disagreement on the question of whether a website operator can
be held civilly liable for its own illegal conduct, specifically participation in child sex trafficking, where thirdparty content is a link in the chain of causation leading
to a plaintiff’s injuries. This conflict produces the unac-
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ceptable result that the forum in which claims against
Backpage.com are brought determines their outcome.
B. The First Circuit’s Decision Fails To
Properly Harmonize Intersecting Statutes
It is well settled that the “classic judicial task of
reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting
them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered
by the implications of a later statute.” United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988); see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143
(2000). This is particularly so where the scope of the
earlier statute is broad but the subsequent statutes
more specifically address the topic at hand. See Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143. The courts below ignored their obligation to parse the relevant statutes
and determine if they can coexist. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“The courts are not
at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective.”); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001)
(“Here we can plainly regard each statute as effective
because of its different requirements and protections.”).
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., this
Court considered the Lanham Act and the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and found that
a plaintiff could maintain a private right of action under
the Lanham Act in the face of an existing FDCA regulatory regime. 134 S. Ct. 2288, 2238-2239 (2014). Finding that “[n]othing in the text, history, or structure of
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the FDCA or the Lanham Act shows the congressional
purpose or design to forbid these suits,” id. at 2233, this
Court concluded that the “best way to harmonize the
statutes” was to allow the appellant’s Lanham Act
claim to proceed. Id. at 2237. POM Wonderful teaches
that when two statutes are not in conflict with one other, it would “show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one
federal statute to preclude the operation of the other.”
Id. at 2238.
In the present case, three victims of child sex trafficking seek redress against a key participant in the
trafficking transactions that caused them grave harm.
The relevant claims and defenses invoke, on the one
hand, the federal TVPRA, which grants victims of sex
trafficking ventures a private right of action, and, on
the other hand, the CDA, enacted in 1996, which offers
an ISP protection from claims that seek to “treat” it as
the “publisher or speaker” of content that was created
entirely by “another.” The TVPRA, which was originally enacted in 2000 and was reauthorized in 2003,
2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013, is a subsequent statute that
“more specifically address[es] the topic at hand” than
the CDA does. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
143. “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”
Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-551. “Nor can it be said that
the two statutes ‘cannot mutually coexist.’ ” J.E.M., 534
U.S. at 143 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 155, (1976)). In passing the TVPRA, Congress likely “did not intend” that a website operator
would be immune from civil liability under the statute’s
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private right of action provision simply because, in addition to the website operator’s own unlawful conduct,
online content created by a third party was also a contributing “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239. By the same token, there is nothing in the language or context of Section 230 of the CDA that Congress intended to immunize website operators from being held civilly liable for
conduct that violates federal criminal law.
In arriving at its decision in POM, this Court observed that general preemption principles are “instructive” even in a dispute involving federal statutes. 134
S. Ct. at 2236. This observation informed the careful
and deferential attention that the Court applied to discerning Congressional intent in that case. This approach to interpretation is dictated here not only because two federal statutes intersect, but for the additional reason that the CDA expressly preempts state
laws that are “inconsistent” with the CDA. See 47
U.S.C. 230(e)(3). The First Circuit, however, declined
to apply preemption principles to constrain its interpretation of the “treat as a publisher” language or to evaluate the relationship between the statutes.
The First Circuit acknowledged that there were
two intersecting federal statutes at play as well as a
parallel state statute. App., infra, 12a-17a. However,
rather than construing Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA in
a manner that would “harmonize” it with the TVPRA
and enable the two statutes “to make sense in combination,” see Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453; POM Wonderful, 134
S. Ct. at 2237, the First Circuit prioritized a “broad”
interpretation of the CDA at the expense of the
TVPRA. Section 230(c)(1)’s plain language, however,
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was susceptible to a narrower reading. Indeed, full effect can be given to the “treat as a publisher” language
of the CDA by protecting those ISPs that are neutral
intermediaries from potential liability related to illegal
content by third parties and by exposing to potential
liability for their own conduct those ISPs that deliberately use their websites to accomplish criminal purposes. This result would have avoided any conflict between the CDA and the TVPRA (and preserved the
“not inconsistent” state statute as well). Under this
Court’s precedents, this was the reading of Section
230(c)(1) that the First Circuit was obliged to adopt.
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518520 (1992) (supporting a “narrow reading” of the outer
limits of an express statutory preemption provision);
see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996). Had the First Circuit done so, no conflict would
have arisen between it and the decisions of the Ninth
Circuit and Washington Supreme Court.
II. THIS IS A CASE OF E XCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE
This case presents the Court with an opportunity
to address the CDA for the first time since Reno v.
ACLU, and to resolve recurring questions concerning
the scope of the protection from liability afforded by
Section 230. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In the twenty years
since the passage of the CDA, lower courts frequently
have grappled with disputes over the proper interpretation of the language of Section 230(c). Despite approximately five hundred lower court decisions, including almost fifty decisions by federal courts of appeal,
Section 230 continues to generate controversy about
the language and the proper mode of analysis of the
statute. See, e.g., Ryan J.P. Dyer, The Communication
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Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev.
837 (2014); Joanna Schorr, Malicious Content on the
Internet: Narrowing Immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 87 St. John’s L. Rev. 733, 737 (2013);
Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for
Narrower Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
863 (2010); Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity:
Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to
Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 Hastings L.J. 1307 (2010). The
First Circuit’s decision dramatically sharpens the differences between the lower courts by extending Section 230 further than any other court and highlights the
need for definitive guidance from this Court.
A. The First Circuit’s Decision Breaks With
The Existing Consensus Concerning The
Breadth Of Section 230
In the twenty years since its passage, Section
230(c)(1) has been cited in over 500 state and federal
opinions. These cases typically arise in the “heartland”
of subject matter that Section 230 was designed to address—that is, cases in which a plaintiff seeks to hold
an ISP liable for the passive transmission of defamato4
ry or offensive content authored by third parties. Such
cases readily fit into Section 230’s framework, because
“publishing” is an element of a defamation claim. See
4

Section 230’s specific focus on defamatory statements and
publisher liability reflect Congress’ goal to incentivize ISPs who
acted in good faith to remove or restrict potentially offensive content. See H.R. Rep. No. 458, supra, at 194.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §§ 577, 581
(1977). To date, all federal circuits have addressed Section 230 at least once, and most of these decisions arise
from defamation claims or allegations that sound in defamation against websites acting as neutral intermediaries.5
While decisions of the Ninth Circuit and other
courts shared a common understanding regarding the
limitations inherent in Section 230’s scope, the First
Circuit’s decision breaks with that consensus regarding
the scope of the statute. The First Circuit applied the
protections of Section 230 where, by the court’s own
5

See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (claims against a message board operator
for allegedly false and defamatory postings by pseudonymous
posters); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.
2015) (defamation claim against neutral web hosting service GoDaddy.com); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003)
(claim against a neutral ISP for failure to prevent the publication
of defamatory information), cert denied, 540 U.S. 877 (2003); Zeran
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (claims
against a neutral ISP for delay in removing defamatory messages
posted by an unidentified third party); Jones v. Dirty World
Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) (defamation
claims against an ISP that operated a user-generated online tabloid that published third-party content); Johnson v. Arden, 614
F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) (defamation claims against a neutral ISP
for defamatory statements posted by third parties); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (defamation
claim against a neutral ISP for publication of a false profile on a
dating website submitted by a third party); Ben Ezra, Weinstein &
Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000) (claim
against a neutral ISP for defamation claims based on third-party
postings); Dowbenko v. Google, Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 801 (11th Cir.
2014) (defamation claim against Google, a neutral search engine,
for defamatory search results that resulted from content on thirdparty websites).
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reasoning, the ISP at issue was not a neutral intermediary. The First Circuit assumed for the purposes of its
decision that respondents’ conduct violated the
TVPRA, which by definition means it could not have
been “neutral” for the purposes of Section 230 immunity. In doing so, the First Circuit expanded Section 230
beyond what any other court of appeals has previously
held. This Court’s guidance is necessary to assure that
the application of Section 230 in cases that fall outside
the “heartland” of defamation-like claims is faithful to
the limited intentions of Congress and that plaintiffs
across the county with claims such as petitioners have
equal access to the courts.
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Has Broad
Consequences For Internet Crime Generally
And Online Child Sex Trafficking In Particular
The First Circuit’s opinion effectively immunizes
an array of criminal conduct by ISPs, expanding the already broad reach of Section 230. In a society now
dominated by digital technology, criminal activity on
the internet has increased markedly, and some portion
of that activity involves affirmative wrongdoing by
ISPs themselves. As just one example of the Internet
serving as a hub for criminal enterprise, the creator of
the website “Silk Road,” who designed a “sophisticated
and extensive [Internet] criminal marketplace” that
enabled thousands of individuals to anonymously transact in illegal drugs without detection, was convicted
last year of seven criminal charges, including narcotics
and money laundering conspiracies. See United States
v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Jury Verdict, Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (Feb. 5, 2015)
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(No. 14cr68). The indictment alleged that Ulbricht,
through the operation of his website, had engaged in
“specific and intentional conduct to join with narcotics
traffickers or computer hackers to help them sell illegal
drugs or hack into computers, and to be involved in enforcing rules (including using murder-for-hire) regarding such sales and taking commissions.” 31 F. Supp. 3d
at 568. Yet, under the First Circuit’s interpretation of
Section 230, through that provision, Congress immunized Ulbricht, a convicted federal felon, from liability to
any person harmed by the illegal activities that took
place via Silk Road—even, potentially, the family of a
victim of a murder-for-hire—could not maintain a civil
claim against Ulbricht, a convicted federal felon.
The consequences of the First Circuit’s broad interpretation are particularly troublesome for efforts to
combat child sex trafficking. In its reauthorizations of
the TVPRA, Congress has been well aware that sex
trafficking has moved from the street corner to the internet, where websites like Backpage.com create virtual red light districts. The TVPRA is a tool that Congress plainly expected that the Department of Justice
and private plaintiffs would use to expand the scope of
enforcement to create further disincentives to sex trafficking. In particular, the TVPRA’s civil enforcement
provision empowers victims to pursue a private right of
action against any persons who “knowingly benefit[ ]
financially * * * from participation in [the underlying
sex trafficking] venture.” 18 U.S.C. 1595. This provision expressly expands the potential defendants beyond
mere “perpetrators” under 1591(a)(1)—i.e., traffickers—to participants who provide support for the “[the
underlying sex trafficking] venture.”
18 U.S.C.
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1591(a)(2). There is nothing in the language or context
of the statute that suggests that Congress intended to
exclude websites that facilitate the commercial sex
business from the reach of the TVPRA. Such an exemption would be akin to an exemption for brick-andmortal hotels that openly solicit and support illegal
commercial sex on their premises, which is directly inconsistent with the interpretation taken by the United
States. See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, Louisiana Motel
Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case (July 1,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-o
wner-pleads-guilty-sex-trafficking-case (prosecution of
motel owner for financially benefiting from sex trafficking ventures).
In this case, the First Circuit’s “but-for” gloss on
the “treat as a publisher” language of Section 230 plainly undermines legislative efforts to curtail the sexual
exploitation of children. The decision therefore transforms the CDA from a shield for neutral ISPs from defamation suits and analogous forms of civil liability into
a dangerous sword wielded by Backpage.com and other
criminal enterprises to enable their unlawful conduct.
Indeed, the First Circuit’s interpretation essentially
rejects the common sense proposition that Section 230
does not relieve websites of the obligation to “comply
with laws of general applicability,” including those prohibiting the sale of children for sex. Roommates.com,
521 F.3d at 1164 n.15. This is a stunning proposition
that bears careful examination and analysis. This case
presents an opportunity to correct and reconcile the
boundaries of Section 230 with the TVPRA and its goal
of protecting children from sex trafficking.
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C. The First Circuit’s Reasoning Extends To
Other Statutory Private Rights Of Action
The First Circuit’s treatment of the TVPRA and
the MATA could have ramifications in other contexts
where Congress or the States have created private
rights of action that are integral to the enforcement of
criminal or civil statutes. This Court has often recognized the value and importance of private civil remedies
in statutory enforcement schemes. See, e.g., Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557-558 (2000) (holding the object
of the RICO civil enforcement provision “is thus not
merely to compensate victims but to turn them into
prosecutors * * * dedicated to eliminating racketeering
activity”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634-635 (1985) (“Without
doubt, the private cause of action plays a central role in
enforcing [the Sherman Act antitrust] regime.”) .
Congress has frequently included such private
rights of action to enhance statutory enforcement
schemes. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act contains a civil liability provision, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), that
allows victims of “act[s] of international terrorism” to
recover damages for their injuries. Numerous statutes
similarly afford private rights of actions that are integral to enforcement goals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1964(c)
(authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act); 18 U.S.C. 2252A (authorizing private plaintiffs to
sue for violations of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996); 18 U.S.C. 1030(g) (authorizing private
plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act); 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(1) (authorizing pri-
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vate plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016).6
Nothing in the language of the CDA, the TVPRA,
or these other specialized enforcement statutes suggests that an ISP that participates in terrorism, racketeering, or sex trafficking ought to be shielded against
statutory civil liability for their own aid to and participation in that illegal conduct. Yet the First Circuit’s
reasoning in this sex trafficking case, applied to these
other statutes, likely will foreclose a civil action against
a website operator for its affirmative conduct so long as
third-party content appearing on the internet forms
some part of the chain of events that leads to liability.
This case provides this Court with an opportunity to
resolve whether, as petitioners contend, this is a result
that Congress “did not intend.” POM Wonderful v. Coca Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014).

6

In addition, the civil code contains numerous statutory provisions creating private rights of action. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)
(authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) (authorizing private
plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Lanham Act); 15 U.S.C.
1691e(a) (authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 15 U.S.C. 1640(a) (authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Truth in Lending Act); 15
U.S.C. 15(a) (authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of
the Clayton Antitrust Act).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is a hard case —
hard not in the sense that the legal issues defy resolution, but hard in the sense that the law requires that
we, like the court below, deny relief to plaintiffs whose
circumstances evoke outrage. The result we must
reach is rooted in positive law. Congress addressed the
right to publish the speech of others in the Information
Age when it enacted the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (CDA). See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Congress later addressed the need to guard against the evils of sex trafficking when it enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), codified as
relevant here at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595. These laudable legislative efforts do not fit together seamlessly,
and this case reflects the tension between them. Striking the balance in a way that we believe is consistent
with both congressional intent and the teachings of
precedent, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal. The tale follows.
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we
draw upon the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the
operative pleading (here, the second amended com-
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plaint). See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 438 (1st
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Backpage.com provides online classified advertising, allowing users to post advertisements in a range of
categories based on the product or service being sold.1
Among the categories provided is one for “Adult Entertainment,” which includes a subcategory labeled
“Escorts.” The site is differentiated by geographic area, enabling users to target their advertisements and
permitting potential customers to see local postings.
This suit involves advertisements posted in the
“Escorts” section for three young women — all minors
at the relevant times — who claim to have been victims
of sex trafficking. Suing pseudonymously, the women
allege that Backpage, with an eye to maximizing its
profits, engaged in a course of conduct designed to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims
on the website. This strategy, the appellants say, led to
their victimization.
Past is prologue. In 2010, a competing website
(Craigslist) shuttered its adult advertising section due
to concerns about sex trafficking. Spying an opportunity, Backpage expanded its marketing footprint in the
adult advertising arena. According to the appellants,
the expansion had two aspects. First, Backpage engaged in a campaign to distract attention from its role
in sex trafficking by, for example, meeting on various
occasions with hierarchs of the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and making
1

The appellants sued Backpage.com, LLC, Camarillo Holdings,
LLC, and New Times Media, LLC. For ease in exposition, we refer to these three affiliated companies, collectively, as “Backpage.”
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“false and misleading representations” to the NCMEC
and law enforcement regarding its efforts to combat
sex trafficking. But this campaign, the appellants suggest, was merely a ruse.
The second aspect of Backpage’s expansion strategy involved the deliberate structuring of its website to
facilitate sex trafficking. The appellants aver that
Backpage selectively removed certain postings made in
the “Escorts” section (such as postings made by victim
support organizations and law enforcement “sting” advertisements) and tailored its posting requirements to
make sex trafficking easier.2
In addition, the appellants allege that Backpage’s
rules and processes governing the content of advertisements are designed to encourage sex trafficking.
For example, Backpage does not require phone number
verification and permits the posting of phone numbers
in alternative formats. There is likewise no e-mail verification, and Backpage provides users with the option
to “hide” their e-mail addresses in postings, because
Backpage provides message forwarding services and
auto-replies on behalf of the advertiser. Photographs
uploaded for use in advertisements are shorn of their
metadata, thus removing from scrutiny information
2

The appellants note that (among other things) the process of
posting an advertisement in the “Escorts” section does not require
the poster to provide either identifying information or the subject
of the advertisement. And even though the website does require
that posters verify that they are 18 years of age or older to post in
that section, entering an age below 18 on the first (or any successive) attempt does not block a poster from entering a different age
on a subsequent attempt. Backpage also allows users to pay posting fees anonymously through prepaid credit cards or digital currencies.
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such as the date, time, and location the photograph was
taken. While Backpage’s automated filtering system
screens out advertisements containing certain prohibited terms, such as “barely legal” and “high school,” a
failed attempt to enter one of these terms does not prevent the poster from substituting workarounds, such as
“brly legal” or “high schl.”
The appellants suggest that Backpage profits from
having its thumb on the scale in two ways. First, advertisements in the “Adult Entertainment” section are
the only ones for which Backpage charges a posting fee.
Second, users may pay an additional fee for “Sponsored
Ads,” which appear on the right-hand side of every
page of the “Escorts” section. A “Sponsored Ad” includes a smaller version of the image from the posted
advertisement and information about the location and
availability of the advertised individual.
Beginning at age 15, each of the appellants was
trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.
Jane Doe #1 was advertised on Backpage during two
periods in 2012 and 2013. She estimates that, as a result, she was raped over 1,000 times. Jane Doe #2 was
advertised on Backpage between 2010 and 2012. She
estimates that, as a result, she was raped over 900
times. Jane Doe #3 was advertised on Backpage from
December of 2013 until some unspecified future date.
3
As a result, she was raped on numerous occasions. All
of the rapes occurred either in Massachusetts or Rhode
3

Once the parents of Doe #3 located some of the Backpage advertisements featuring their daughter, they demanded that the advertisements be removed from the website. A week later (after at
least one other entreaty to Backpage), the postings remained on
the website.
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Island. Sometimes the sex traffickers posted the advertisements directly and sometimes they forced the
victims to post the advertisements.
Typically, each posted advertisement included images of the particular appellant, usually taken by the
traffickers (but advertisements for Doe #3 included
some pictures that she herself had taken). Many of the
advertisements embodied challenged practices such as
anonymous payment for postings, coded terminology
meant to refer to underage girls, and altered telephone
numbers.
The appellants filed suit against Backpage in October of 2014. The operative pleading is the appellants’
second amended complaint, which limns three sets of
claims. The first set consists of claims that Backpage
engaged in sex trafficking of minors as defined by the
TVPRA and its Massachusetts counterpart, the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §
50(a). The second set consists of claims under a Massachusetts consumer protection statute, which forbids
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A,
§ 2(a). The last set consists of claims alleging abridgements of intellectual property rights.
In due season, Backpage moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state claims upon
which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Although the appellants vigorously opposed
the motion, the district court dismissed the action in its
entirety. See Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC,
104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 165 (D. Mass. 2015). This timely
appeal ensued.

8a
II.

ANALYSIS

The appellants, ably represented, have constructed
a series of arguments. Those arguments are buttressed
by a legion of amici (whose helpful briefs we appreciate). We review the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ complaint for failure to state any actionable
claim de novo, taking as true the well-pleaded facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the appellants’ favor. See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 441. In undertaking
this canvass, we are not bound by the district court’s
ratiocination but may affirm the dismissal on any
ground apparent from the record. See Santiago v.
Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011). It is
through this prism that we evaluate the appellants’ asseverational array.
A. Trafficking Claims.
The appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion that section 230 of the CDA shields Backpage from
liability for a course of conduct that allegedly amounts
to participation in sex trafficking. We begin our consideration of this challenge with the text of section
230(c), which provides:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or
speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.
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(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of —
(A) any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers
or others the technical
means to restrict access to
material described in [subparagraph (A)].
47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Congress enacted this statute partially in response to court cases that held internet publishers liable for defamatory statements posted by third
parties on message boards maintained by the publishers. See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995) (explaining that Prodigy was liable because, unlike some other website operators, it had taken steps to
screen or edit content posted on its message board).
Section 230(c) limits this sort of liability in two ways.
Principally, it shields website operators from being
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“treated as the publisher or speaker” of material posted
by users of the site, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which means
that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable
for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions — such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content — are barred,” Zeran
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
Relatedly, it allows website operators to engage in
blocking and screening of third-party content, free from
liability for such good-faith efforts. See 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2)(A).
There has been near-universal agreement that section 230 should not be construed grudgingly. See, e.g.,
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008);
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
456 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.
2003). This preference for broad construction recognizes that websites that display third-party content may
have an infinite number of users generating an enormous amount of potentially harmful content, and holding website operators liable for that content “would
have an obvious chilling effect” in light of the difficulty
of screening posts for potential issues. Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 331. The obverse of this proposition is equally salient: Congress sought to encourage websites to make
efforts to screen content without fear of liability. See
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; see also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418-19. Such a hands-off approach
is fully consistent with Congress’s avowed desire to
permit the continued development of the internet with
minimal regulatory interference. See 47 U.S.C. §
230(a)(4), (b)(2).
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In holding Backpage harmless here, the district
court found section 230(c)(1) controlling. See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 154-56. Section 230(c)(1)
can be broken down into three component parts. It
shields conduct if the defendant (1) ”is a ‘provider or
user of an interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is
based on ‘information provided by another information
content provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [the defendant] ‘as the publisher or speaker’ of that information.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1)). The appellants do not allege that Backpage
fails to satisfy either of the first two elements.4 Instead, they confine themselves to the argument that
their asserted causes of action do not treat Backpage as
the publisher or speaker of the contents of the advertisements through which they were trafficked. It is to
this argument that we now turn.
The broad construction accorded to section 230 as a
whole has resulted in a capacious conception of what it
means to treat a website operator as the publisher or
speaker of information provided by a third party.
Courts have recognized that “many causes of action
might be premised on the publication or speaking of
what one might call ‘information content.’” Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). The
ultimate question, though, does not depend on the form
of the asserted cause of action; rather, it depends on
4

Certain amici advance an argument forsworn by the appellants in
the district court: that Backpage’s activities amount to creating
the content of the advertisements. It is, however, clear beyond
hope of contradiction that amici cannot “interject into a case issues
which the litigants, whatever their reasons might be, have chosen
to ignore.” Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st
Cir. 1989).
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whether the cause of action necessarily requires that
the defendant be treated as the publisher or speaker of
content provided by another. See id. at 1101-02. Thus,
courts have invoked the prophylaxis of section 230(c)(1)
in connection with a wide variety of causes of action,
including housing discrimination, see Chi. Lawyers’
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008), negligence, see
Doe, 528 F.3d at 418, Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318
F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003); and securities fraud and
cyberstalking, see Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-22.
The appellants have an uphill climb: the TVPRA
claims that they appear to treat Backpage as the publisher or speaker of the content of the challenged advertisements. After all, the appellants acknowledge in
their complaint that the contents of all of the relevant
advertisements were provided either by their traffickers or by the appellants themselves (under orders from
their traffickers). Since the appellants were trafficked
by means of these advertisements, there would be no
harm to them but for the content of the postings.
The appellants nonetheless insist that their allegations do not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker of
third-party content. They rest this hypothesis largely
on the text of the TVPRA’s civil remedy provision,
which provides that victims may bring a civil suit
against a perpetrator “or whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or
should have known has engaged in an act” of sex trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); see id. § 1591. Characterizing their allegations as describing “an affirmative
course of conduct” by Backpage distinct from the exer-
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cise of the “traditional publishing or editorial functions”
protected under the CDA, the appellants contend that
this course of conduct amounts to participation in sex
trafficking and, thus, can ground liability without treating Backpage as the publisher or speaker of any of the
underlying content. This contention comprises more
cry than wool.
We begin with the appellants’ assertion that Backpage’s activities do not involve traditional publishing or
editorial functions, and are therefore outside the protective carapace of section 230(c)(1). In support, the
complaint describes choices that Backpage has made
about the posting standards for advertisements — for
example, rules about which terms are permitted or not
permitted in a posting, the lack of controls on the display of phone numbers, the option to anonymize e-mail
addresses, the stripping of metadata from photographs
uploaded to the website, the website’s reaction after a
forbidden term is entered into an advertisement, and
Backpage’s acceptance of anonymous payments. The
appellants submit that these choices are distinguishable
from publisher functions. We disagree.
As an initial matter, some of the challenged practices — most obviously, the choice of what words or
phrases can be displayed on the site — are traditional
publisher functions under any coherent definition of the
term. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (describing decisions
about “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content” as “traditional editorial functions”). And after
careful consideration, we are convinced that the “publisher or speaker” language of section 230(c)(1) extends
to the formulation of precisely the sort of website policies and practices that the appellants assail.
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Precedent cinches the matter. In Lycos, we considered the argument that the prophylaxis of section
230 (c) did not encompass “decisions regarding the ‘construct and operation’” of a defendant’s websites. 478
F.3d at 422. There, the plaintiffs alleged that Lycos
permitted users to register under multiple screen
names and provided links to “objective financial information” from a finance-related message board, thus enabling “individuals to spread misinformation more credibly.” Id. at 420. We noted that, at bottom, the plaintiffs were “ultimately alleging that the construct and
operation of Lycos’s web sites contributed to the proliferation of misinformation” and held that as long as “the
cause of action is one that would treat the service provider as the publisher of a particular posting, immunity
applies not only for the service provider’s decisions
with respect to that posting, but also for its inherent
decisions about how to treat postings generally.” Id. at
422. In short, “Lycos’s decision not to reduce misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much
an editorial decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a particular posting.”
Id.
The case at hand fits comfortably within this construct. Without exception, the appellants’ well-pleaded
claims address the structure and operation of the
Backpage website, that is, Backpage’s decisions about
how to treat postings. Those claims challenge features
that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of the website (such as the lack of phone number
verification, the rules about whether a person may post
after attempting to enter a forbidden term, and the
procedure for uploading photographs). Features such
as these, which reflect choices about what content can
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appear on the website and in what form, are editorial
choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions.5
At oral argument in this court, the appellants
placed particular emphasis on Backpage’s provision of
e-mail anonymization, forwarding, auto-reply, and storage services to posters. In the last analysis, however,
the decision to provide such services and the parallel
decision not to impose the same conditions on messaging services as are applied to “Escorts” section postings
are no less publisher choices, entitled to the protections
of section 230(c)(1).
We add, moreover, that applying section 230(c)(1)
to shield Backpage from liability here is congruent with
the case law elsewhere. Relying on that provision,
courts have rejected claims that attempt to hold website operators liable for failing to provide sufficient protections to users from harmful content created by others. For instance, where a minor claimed to have been
sexually assaulted by someone she met through the defendant’s website and her suit alleged that the website
operator “fail[ed] to implement basic safety measures
to protect minors,” the Fifth Circuit rejected the suit
on the basis that the claims were “merely another way
of claiming that [the website operator] was liable for
publishing the communications and they speak to [the
website operator’s] role as a publisher of online thirdparty-generated content.” Doe, 528 F.3d at 419-20.
5

The appellants argue that a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village
Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718-24 (Wash. 2015)
(en banc) (Wiggins, J., concurring), points to a different conclusion.
But our reasoning in Lycos — which the J.S. concurrence failed to
address — defeats this argument.
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Although the appellants try to distinguish Doe by
claiming Backpage’s decisions about what measures to
implement deliberately attempt to make sex trafficking
easier, this is a distinction without a difference. Whatever Backpage’s motivations, those motivations do not
alter the fact that the complaint premises liability on
the decisions that Backpage is making as a publisher
with respect to third-party content.
Nor does the text of the TVPRA’s civil remedy
provision change this result. Though a website conceivably might display a degree of involvement sufficient to render its operator both a publisher and a participant in a sex trafficking venture (say, that the website operator helped to procure the underaged youths
who were being trafficked), the facts pleaded in the second amended complaint do not appear to achieve this
duality. But even if we assume, for argument’s sake,
that Backpage’s conduct amounts to “participation in a
[sex trafficking] venture” — a phrase that no published
opinion has yet interpreted — the TVPRA claims as
pleaded premise that participation on Backpage’s actions as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.
The strictures of section 230(c) foreclose such suits.6
Contrary to the appellants’ importunings, the decision in Barnes does not demand a different outcome.
There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a promissory
estoppel claim based on a Yahoo executive’s statements
that the company would remove explicit photographs
6

To be sure, the complaint contains a few allegations that do not
involve the publication of third-party content. Yet those allegations, treated in detail in Part II(B) infra, rely on sententious
rhetoric rather than well-pleaded facts. Thus, they cannot suffice
to alter our conclusion here.
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that had been posted online without the consent of the
person depicted was not barred by section 230(c)(1).
See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098-99, 1109. Withal, this
promissory estoppel claim did not attempt to treat Yahoo as the publisher or speaker of the photograph’s
content but, instead, the claim sought to hold Yahoo liable for its “manifest intention to be legally obligated to
do something” (that is, to delete the photographs). Id.
at 1107. No comparable promise has been alleged here.
That ends this aspect of the matter. We hold that
claims that a website facilitates illegal conduct through
its posting rules necessarily treat the website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by third parties
and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1). This holding is consistent with, and reaffirms, the principle that
a website operator’s decisions in structuring its website
and posting requirements are publisher functions entitled to section 230(c)(1) protection.
In this case, third-party content is like Banquo’s
ghost: it appears as an essential component of each and
all of the appellants’ TVPRA claims. Because the appellants’ claims under the TVPRA necessarily treat
Backpage as the publisher or speaker of content supplied by third parties, the district court did not err in
dismissing those claims.7
In an effort to shift the trajectory of the debate,
the appellants try a pair of end runs. First, the appel7

Although the parties do not separately parse the text of the MATA, those claims fail for essentially the same reasons: they treat
Backpage as the publisher or speaker of content provided by third
parties. As a result, the MATA — at least in this application — is
necessarily inconsistent with the protections provided by section
230(c)(1) and, therefore, preempted. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
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lants call our attention to section 230(c)(2), which provides that decisions made by website operators to block
or remove content are protected from liability as long
as they are made in good faith. Building on this foundation, the appellants assert that the district court relied
on Backpage’s descriptions of its efforts to block and
screen the postings in the “Escorts” section of its website, and that those descriptions amount to an implicit
invocation of section 230(c)(2). So, the appellants say,
the district court should have allowed discovery into
Backpage’s good faith (or lack of it) in blocking and
screening content. The district court’s refusal to allow
them to pursue this course, they charge, eviscerates
section 230(c)(2) and renders it superfluous.
The appellants start from a faulty premise: we do
not read the district court’s opinion as relying on Backpage’s assertions about its behavior. That Backpage
sought to respond to allegations of misconduct by
(among other things) touting its efforts to combat sex
trafficking does not, without more, invoke section
230(c)(2) as a defense.
The appellants’ suggestion of superfluity is likewise misplaced. Courts routinely have recognized that
section 230(c)(2) provides a set of independent protections for websites, see, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105;
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 670-71; Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.14 (9th Cir., and nothing
about the district court’s analysis is at odds with that
conclusion.
Next, the appellants suggest that their TVPRA
claims are saved by the operation of section 230(e)(1).
That provision declares that section 230 should not “be
construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Fed-
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eral criminal statute.” The appellants posit that the
TVPRA’s civil suit provision is part of the “enforcement” of a federal criminal statute under the plain
meaning of that term and, thus, outside the protections
afforded by section 230(c)(1). This argument, though
creative, does not withstand scrutiny.
We start with the uncontroversial premise that,
where feasible, “a statute should be construed in a way
that conforms to the plain meaning of its text.” In re
Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995). The plainlanguage reading of section 230(e)(1)’s reference to “the
enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute”
dictates a meaning opposite to that ascribed by the appellants: such a reading excludes civil suits. See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (pointing out that “the
common definition of the term ‘criminal,’ as well as its
use in the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically excludes and is distinguished from civil claims” (quoting
Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL
3813758, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006))). Other traditional tools of statutory construction reinforce this conclusion. Although titles or captions may not be used to
contradict a statute’s text, they can be useful to resolve
textual ambiguities. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt.
& Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947); Berniger
v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir.
1991). Here, the subsection’s title, “[n]o effect on criminal law,” quite clearly indicates that the provision is
limited to criminal prosecutions.
It is equally telling that where Congress wanted to
include both civil and criminal remedies in CDA provisions, it did so through broader language. For instance,
section 230(e)(4) states that the protections of section
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230 should not “be construed to limit the application of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” a
statute that contains both criminal penalties and civil
remedies. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520. Preserving the
“application” of this Act contrasts with Congress’s significantly narrower word choice in safeguarding the
“enforcement” of federal criminal statutes. The normal
presumption is that the employment of different words
within the same statutory scheme is deliberate, so the
terms ordinarily should be given differing meanings.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9
(2004).
This holding is entirely in keeping with the policies
animating section 230(e)(1). Congress made pellucid
that it sought “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish” illicit activities
online, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5); and this policy coexists
comfortably with Congress’s choice “not to deter harmful online speech through the . . . route of imposing tort
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties’ potentially injurious messages,” Lycos,
478 F.3d at 418 (omission in original) (quoting Zeran,
129 F.3d at 330-31). Seen in this light, the distinctions
between civil and criminal actions — including the disparities in the standard of proof and the availability of
prosecutorial discretion — reflect a legislative judgment that it is best to avoid the potential chilling effects that private civil actions might have on internet
free speech.
To say more about these attempted end runs would
be pointless. They are futile, and do not cast the slightest doubt on our conclusion that the district court ap-
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propriately dismissed the appellants’ sex trafficking
claims as barred by section 230(c)(1).
B. Chapter 93A Claims.
We turn next to the appellants’ state-law unfair
trade practices claims. A Massachusetts statute, familiarly known as Chapter 93A, creates a private right of
action in favor of any individual “who has been injured
by another person’s use or employment” of unfair or
deceptive business practices. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A, § 9(1). The appellants’ Chapter 93A claims (as
framed on appeal) target misrepresentations allegedly
made by Backpage to law enforcement and the
NCMEC regarding Backpage’s efforts at selfregulation. The district court jettisoned these claims,
concluding that the causal chain alleged by the appellants was “too speculative to fall as a matter of law
within the penumbra of reasonabl[e] foreseeability.”
Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
As this ruling hinges on the plausibility of the appellants’ allegations of causation, we first rehearse the
plausibility standard. It is, of course, apodictic that a
plaintiff must supply “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this requirement does not
call for the pleading of exquisite factual detail, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Evaluating the plausibility of a complaint is a twostep process. First, “the court must separate the complaint’s factual allegations (which must be accepted as
true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need
not be credited).” Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676
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F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, the court must determine whether the remaining facts allow it “to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In carrying out this evaluation, the court must view the claim as a whole, instead
of demanding “a one-to-one relationship between any
single allegation and a necessary element of the cause
of action.” Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711
F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013).
With this standard in mind, we proceed to the appellants’ assignment of error. To prevail on a Chapter
93A claim of this sort, the “plaintiff must prove causation — that is, the plaintiff is required to prove that the
defendant’s unfair or deceptive act caused an adverse
consequence or loss.” Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims,
Inc., 961 N.E.2d 1067, 1076 (Mass. 2012). This requirement entails showing both “a causal connection between the deception and the loss and that the loss was
foreseeable as a result of the deception.” Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Casavant
v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 952 N.E.2d 908, 912
(Mass. 2011)). In other words, the plaintiff must lay the
groundwork for findings of both actual and proximate
causation. If an examination of the claim leads to the
conclusion that it fails plausibly to allege a causal chain
sufficient to ground an entitlement to relief, that claim
is susceptible to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See
A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 82 &
n.2 (1st Cir. 2013).
Here, the second amended complaint attempts to
forge the causal chain as follows: Backpage made a series of disingenuous representations to law enforce-
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ment officers and the NCMEC regarding its supposed
commitment to combating sex trafficking, including
representations about technical changes to its website
and its efforts to screen and monitor postings; Backpage neither kept these commitments nor made the
technical changes that had been discussed; instead,
Backpage engaged in a series of pretextual actions to
generate the appearance of combating sex trafficking
(though it knew that these actions would not actually
eliminate sex trafficking from the website); this amalgam of misrepresentations and deceptive practices
“minimized and delayed” any real scrutiny of what
Backpage was actually doing, thus allowing Backpage
to gain a dominant market share in the online advertising of sex trafficking; and this sequence of events
harmed the appellants by increasing their risk of being
trafficked.
This causal chain is shot through with conjecture: it
pyramids speculative inference upon speculative inference. This rampant guesswork extends to the effect of
the alleged misrepresentations on an indeterminate
number of third parties, the real impact of Backpage’s
behavior on the overall marketplace for sex trafficking,
and the odds that the appellants would not have been
victimized had Backpage been more forthright.
When all is said and done, it is apparent that the attenuated causal chain proposed by the appellants is
forged entirely out of surmise. Put another way, the
causation element is backed only by “the type of conclusory statement[s] that need not be credited at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage.” Maddox, 732 F.3d at 80. Charges
hinting at Machiavellian manipulation (such as the
charge that Backpage’s “communications with NCMEC
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were simply an effort to create a diversion as Backpage.com solidified its market position” or the charge
that Backpage’s posting review program “appears to be
merely superficial”) cannot serve as surrogates for
well-pleaded facts.
To be sure, the complaint does plead a few hard
facts. For example, it indicates that some meetings occurred involving Backpage and the NCMEC. It also
indicates that Backpage made some efforts (albeit not
the ones that the NCMEC recommended) to address
sex trafficking. But beyond these scanty assertions,
the complaint does not offer factual support for its attenuated causal analysis.
In an effort to plug this gaping hole, the appellants
argue that in a Chapter 93A case the plausibility of
causation should be tested at the pleading stage not by
looking at facts but, rather, by employing “common
economic sense.” Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769, 2015 WL 314131, at *4 (D.
Mass. Jan. 26, 2015); accord Katin v. Nat’l Real Estate
Info. Servs., Inc., No. 07-10882, 2009 WL 929554, at *7,
*10 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2009). Yet, facts are the linchpin
of plausibility; and the cases that the appellants cite are
inapposite. Those cases involve competitors suing each
other pursuant to section 11 of Chapter 93A. This distinction is significant because although causation in section 11 cases between competitors turns on the decisions of third parties (customers), the causal chain between the unfair act and the harm to the plaintiff is
much shorter and more direct than the chain that the
appellants so laboriously attempt to construct.
The short of it is that the pertinent allegations in
the second amended complaint are insufficient “to re-
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move the possibility of relief from the realm of mere
conjecture.” Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442. It follows inexorably that the district court did not err in dismissing
the appellants’ Chapter 93A claims.8
C. Intellectual Property Claims.
This brings us to the appellants’ intellectual property claims. Section 230 provides that “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(e)(2). We assume, without deciding, that the appellants’ remaining claims come within the compass of this
exception.9
1. Unauthorized Use of Pictures of a Person. All
of the appellants brought claims under state laws (Massachusetts and/or Rhode Island) guarding against the
unauthorized use of a person’s picture. See Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 214, § 3A; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28. These
nearly identical statutes, reprinted in relevant part in
8

For the sake of completeness, we note that the court below held,
in the alternative, that the appellants’ Chapter 93A claims were
barred by section 230(c)(1). See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at
162-63. We express no opinion on this alternative holding.

9

The application of the exemption to the appellants’ state law
claims for the unauthorized use of pictures is not free from doubt.
At least one court of appeals has suggested that state law intellectual property claims are not covered by this exemption. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19, 1119 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2007); but cf. Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422-23, 423 n.7 (applying section 230(e)(2) to a claim under state trademark law, albeit without
detailed analysis). To make a muddled matter even murkier,
Backpage argues that the unauthorized use of pictures claims do
not involve intellectual property but, rather, stem from privacy
rights protected by tort law. We need not reach either of these
issues.
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10

the margin, confer private rights of action upon individuals whose images are used for commercial purposes
without their consent. The appellants insist that Backpage, by garnering advertising revenues from their
traffickers, profited from the unauthorized use of their
photographs. This fusillade is wide of the mark: the
statutes in question impose liability only upon persons
or entities who deliberately use another’s image for
commercial gain. As we explain below, Backpage (on
the facts alleged here) is not such an entity.
Neither the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC) nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has confronted the exact scenario that is presented here. Our
10

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A provides in relevant part that:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture
is used within the commonwealth for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade without his
written consent may bring a civil action . . .
against the person so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof;
and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28(a) provides, as pertinent here, that:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture
is used within the state for commercial purposes
without his or her written consent may bring an
action . . . against the person so using his or her
name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain
the use thereof, and may recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use.

To the modest extent that the wording of these statutes differs, neither the appellants nor Backpage suggests that the differences affect our analysis in any way. We therefore treat the statutes interchangeably.
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task, then, is to make an informed determination of how
each court would rule if it faced the question, taking into account analogous state decisions, cases from other
jurisdictions, learned treatises, and relevant policy rationales. See Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008). Here,
the tea leaves are easy to read.
The SJC has articulated the key point in the following way: “the crucial distinction . . . must be between
situations in which the defendant makes an incidental
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture and those
in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture deliberately to exploit its value for advertising or trade purposes.” Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly
Co., 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1980). Exploitation for
advertising or trade purposes requires that the use of
the image be “for the purpose of appropriating to the
defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977)). So,
too, the nearly identical Rhode Island statute requires
a showing that by using the image “the defendant
commercially exploited [the plaintiff] without his permission.” Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 843
A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); accord Mendonsa v. Time Inc.,
678 F. Supp. 967, 971 (D.R.I. 1988).
The appellants argue that the use of their images
cannot be written off as incidental because their pictures were “the centerpieces of commercial advertisements.” But this argument misapprehends both the
case law and the rationale that animates the underlying
right. Tropeano exemplifies the point. That case involved the publication of the plaintiff’s image to illus-
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trate a magazine article in which she was not even
mentioned. See 400 N.E.2d at 848. The SJC concluded
that this was an incidental use of the image, notwithstanding that the article and accompanying picture
could be said to benefit the publisher. See id. at 851.
The fact that the publisher was a for-profit business did
“not by itself transform the incidental publication of the
plaintiff’s picture into an appropriation for advertising
or trade purposes.” Id.
In our view, Tropeano establishes that even a use
leading to some profit for the publisher is not a use for
advertising or trade purposes unless the use is designed to “appropriat[e] to the defendant’s benefit the
commercial or other values associated with the name or
likeness.” Id. at 850 (quoting Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1224).
That is the rule in Massachusetts, and we are confident
that essentially the same rule prevails in Rhode Island.
Here, there is no basis for an inference that Backpage appropriated the commercial value of the appellants’ images. Although Backpage does profit from the
sale of advertisements, it is not the entity that benefits
from the misappropriation. A publisher like Backpage
is “merely the conduit through which the advertising
and publicity matter of customers” is conveyed,
Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 506 (Ga. Ct. App.
1966), and the party who actually benefits from the
misappropriation is the advertiser. Matters might be
different if Backpage had used the pictures to advertise
its own services, see id., but the appellants proffer no
such claim.
Basic policy considerations reinforce this result.
There would be obviously deleterious consequences to a
rule placing advertising media, such as newspapers,
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television stations, or websites, at risk of liability every
time they sell an advertisement to a party who engages
in misappropriation of another person’s likeness. Given
this verity, it is hardly surprising that the appellants
have identified no case in which a publisher of an advertisement furnished by a third party has been held
liable for a misappropriation present within it. The
proper target of any suit for damages in such a situation must be the advertiser who increases his own
business through the misappropriation (in this case, the
traffickers).11
We need not tarry. On this understanding, we uphold the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’
claims under the aforementioned state statutes.
2. Copyright. The last leg of our journey takes us
to a singular claim of copyright infringement. Shortly
after the institution of suit, Doe #3 registered a copyright in one of the photographs used by her traffickers.
In the second amended complaint, she included a claim
for copyright infringement. The court below dismissed
this claim, reasoning that it identified no redressable
injury. See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 165. Doe
#3 challenges this ruling.
Assuming (without deciding) that Backpage could
be held liable for copyright infringement, the scope of
Doe #3’s potential recovery is limited by the fact that
she did not register her copyright until December of
2014 — after the instant action had been filed. By then,
11

This is precisely the situation reflected in the earliest right of
privacy cases, see, e.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97 (R.I.
1909), and the state statutes in this case are designed to codify
liability for that sort of commercial conduct, see Mendonsa, 678 F.
Supp. at 969-70; Tropeano, 400 N.E.2d at 850-51.
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Backpage was no longer displaying the copyrighted image. Given the timing of these events, Doe #3 cannot
recover either statutory damages or attorneys’ fees
under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 412; Johnson
v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005). Any recovery
would be restricted to compensatory damages under 17
U.S.C. § 504(b), which permits a successful suitor to recover “the actual damages suffered by . . . her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not
taken into account in computing the actual damages.”
The prospect of such a recovery, however, is purely
theoretical: nothing in the complaint raises a plausible
inference that Doe #3 can recover any damages, or that
discovery would reveal such an entitlement. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (stating that factual allegations must at least “raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” to suffice as plausible).
A showing of actual damages requires a plaintiff to
prove “that the infringement was the cause of [her] loss
of revenue.” Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994). Such a
loss is typically measured by assessing the diminution
in a copyrighted work’s market value (say, by calculating lost licensing fees). See Bruce v. Weekly World
News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2002); Data
Gen., 36 F.3d at 1170. No facts set forth in the second
amended complaint suggest that the market value of
Doe #3’s image has been affected in any way by the alleged infringement, and Doe #3 points to nothing that
might plausibly support such an inference.
By the same token, nothing in the complaint plausibly suggests a basis for a finding that Doe #3 would be
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entitled to profits attributable to the infringement. The
closest that the complaint comes is an optimistic assertion that because photographs “enhance the effectiveness of advertisements,” Backpage necessarily reaps a
financial benefit from these images (including, presumably, Doe #3’s photograph). But a generalized assertion
that a publisher/infringer profits from providing customers with the option to display photographs in advertisements, standing alone, cannot plausibly be said
to link the display of a particular image to some discrete portion of the publisher/infringer’s profits. Cf.
Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 914-16 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding, at summary judgment, that the effect of
including a photograph in an advertising brochure was
too speculative to make out a triable issue on advertiser’s profits attributable to infringement). In short, the
link that Doe #3 attempts to fashion between the copyrighted photograph and Backpage’s revenues is wholly
speculative and, thus, does not cross the plausibility
threshold. After all, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In a last ditch effort to bell the cat, Doe #3 contends
that the district court erred in failing to determine
whether she was entitled to injunctive relief under 17
U.S.C. § 502(a), which permits such relief “to prevent
or restrain infringement of a copyright.” She says, in
effect, that Backpage may still possess the copyrighted
photograph and that, therefore, she remains at risk of
future infringement. We reject this contention.
To begin, the mere fact of past infringement does
not entitle a plaintiff to permanent injunctive relief: the
plaintiff must also show “a substantial likelihood of in-
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fringement in the future.” Harolds Stores, Inc. v.
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555 (10th Cir.
1996); see 5 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[B][1][a] (2015). Nothing
in the complaint suggests that there is any substantial
likelihood of future infringement by Backpage with respect to the copyrighted photograph. The known facts
strongly suggest that no such risk exists: the photograph was posted by a third party who no longer has
any sway over Doe #3, and Backpage is not alleged to
post material or create advertisements entirely of its
own accord. Thus, any fears of future infringement
would appear to be unfounded.
Viewing the complaint as a whole, see Twombly,
550 U.S. at 569 n.14, we conclude that the distinctive
facts alleged here simply do not suffice to ground a
finding that Doe #3 is plausibly entitled to any relief on
her copyright claim. Consequently, we discern no error
in the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
III.

CONCLUSION

As a final matter, we add a coda. The appellants’
core argument is that Backpage has tailored its website
to make sex trafficking easier. Aided by the amici, the
appellants have made a persuasive case for that proposition. But Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet when it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant
broad protections to internet publishers. Showing that
a website operates through a meretricious business
model is not enough to strip away those protections. If
the evils that the appellants have identified are deemed
to outweigh the First Amendment values that drive the
CDA, the remedy is through legislation, not through
litigation.
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We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated
above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
All parties shall bear their own costs.
Affirmed.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________
Civil Action No. 14-13870-RGS
JANE DOE NO. 1, a minor child,
by her parent and next friend MARY ROE;
JANE DOE NO. 2; and JANE DOE NO. 3, a minor
child, by her parents and next friends SAM LOE AND
SARA LOE
v.
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO HOLDINGS,
LLC (f/k/a VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS,
LLC), and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC
___________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
___________
May 15, 2015
STEARNS, D.J.
In this litigation, two important public policies collide head on – the suppression of child sex trafficking
and the promotion of a free and open Internet. Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No.
3 (the Doe plaintiffs) seek redress in the form of money
damages from defendants Backpage.com, LLC; Camarillo Holdings, LLC (f/k/a Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC); and New Times Media, LLC. The Doe
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plaintiffs allege that they were molested and repeatedly raped after being advertised as sexual wares on defendants’ website, backpage.com (Backpage). Defendants contend that most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims are
preempted by the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and that the remaining intellectual property claims (unauthorized use of a person’s
image and copyright infringement) fail to state claims
upon which relief may be granted.
BACKGROUND12
Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups
goods and services advertised for sale by geographic
location and subject matter. At issue in this case is the
forum’s adult entertainment section and its subcategory offering the services of “escorts.” The Doe plaintiffs
allege that in the scungy world of adult entertainment,
this section of Backpage is a notorious haven for promoters of the illicit sex trade, and even more troubling,
the trafficking of children for sex. The Doe plaintiffs
contend that Backpage’s business model depends in
large part on the revenues it earns from its involvement in the trafficking of children. To this end, Backpage is alleged to have structured its adult entertainment section to lightly camouflage its illegal content to
divert the attention of law enforcement. In support,
the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) marshals the
following facts:


12

Backpage charges a fee for posting advertisements in the adult entertainment section
(and not in most other licit areas of the web-

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the wellpleaded facts of a complaint.
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site). The fee for the “adult” ads ranges from
$12.00 to $17.00 per posting. Backpage
charges an additional fee for each reposting
of an adult ad, and for featuring the ad (with
a selection of text and photos) prominently on
the right side of the website.


Backpage does not require posters in the
adult entertainment section to verify their
identity. The website also does not require
that the poster use a registered credit card
linked with a name and address, and accepts
anonymous payments in the form of prepaid
credit cards, or pseudo-currencies, such as
Bitcoin.



Backpage does not require a poster to verify
the age of an “escort” whose services are offered on the website. Although the website
will not accept an ad when the poster enters
an age of less than 18, it will permit the poster to immediately re-enter an assumed age.



Backpage does not require any verification of
the telephone numbers posted in its adult entertainment section. It also permits users to
enter telephone numbers using any combination of character strokes rather than in the
more traceable (by law enforcement) nominal
numbers required in other sections of the
website (such as “twoO13fourFive678niNe”
rather than “201-345-6789”). Backpage does
not require posters in the adult entertainment section to use their actual email addresses, but provides an email forwarding
service that protects a poster’s anonymity.
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Backpage strips out metadata associated
with photographs (such as date, time, geolocation and other identifying information) before publishing the photographs on its website. This prevents law enforcement from effectively searching for repostings of the same
photograph.



While Backpage bars the use of certain
words and phrases through its “automatic filtering” system, such as “barely legal,” “high
school,” “innocent,” “sex,” “blow job,” “hand
job,” “schoolgirl,” “teen”, and “teenage,” it
readily permits the use of suggestive circumlocutions like “girl,” “young,” “underage,”
and “fresh.” It also does not filter out easily
recognizable abbreviations of forbidden
words, such as “brly legal” or “high schl.”

The Doe plaintiffs further allege that defendants
have waged a phony war against sex traffickers to divert attention from their illegal activities. While Backpage claims that its adult entertainment advertisements are screened by trained moderators, it has refused to install readily available technology that would
far more accurately detect the trafficking of children.
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Backpage’s highly touted claim to make regular referrals to
the National Center of Missing & Exploited Children
has led to few instances of identification or rescue. Although Backpage will on request remove an offending
ad in the geographic location in which it is posted, it
does nothing to report or remove the identical ad posted in other geographical areas, or other ads involving
the same child. The overall effect, the Doe plaintiffs
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contend, is to create a Potemkin-like “façade of concern” that obscures the shady source of its filthy lucre.
SAC ¶ 34.
Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No.
3 aver that they have been each personally harmed by
defendants’ unsavory business practices. Jane Doe No.
1 was first trafficked by pimps on Backpage after running away from home in February of 2012, when she
was 15 years old. She was again sold on Backpage in
March of 2013, after she ran away a second time. Between June of 2013 and September 10, 2013, her “services” were advertised on Backpage each and every
day. As a result of the ads, she engaged in 10 to 12 sex
transactions daily with adult men in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island. Her pimp moved her from town to town
every two days to avoid detection. Jane Doe No. 1 appeared on some 300 ads on Backpage and was raped
over 1,000 times.
Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1
as an offer of “escort” services, a common euphemism
for prostitution. The Jane Doe No. 1 ads included
known signifiers for child prostitution such as “young,”
“girl,” “fresh,” “tiny,” “roses,” and “party.” Jane Doe
No. 1’s pimp provided a prepaid mobile phone and a
prepaid credit card to conceal Jane Doe No. 1’s identity
when Jane Doe No. 1 placed ads on Backpage. When
Jane Doe No. 1 attempted to enter her true age (which
was under 18) during the purchase of an ad, Backpage
would instruct her to enter her age as 18 or older. Photographs of Jane Doe No. 1 (with her facial features obscured, but at least on one occasion displaying a unique
tattoo) accompanied all of her ads.
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Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked on Backpage by her
pimp during various periods between 2010 and 2012 at
different locations in Massachusetts. She first appeared on Backpage when she was 15 years old, after
she had absconded from a residential program. Ads
featuring Jane Doe No. 2 were posted either by her
pimp or an older woman who worked with him (his
“bottom”). The ads would appear on Backpage on average six times a day. Jane Doe No. 2 was given a prepaid mobile phone to answer calls from would-be customers generated by the Backpage ads. As a result of
the ads, she was coerced into 5-15 sex transactions every day. Like the ads of Jane Doe No. 1, those of Jane
Doe No. 2 featured her photograph. The ads were
placed using a prepaid credit card. Altogether, Jane
Doe No. 2 was raped over 900 times while in the thrall
of her pimp.
Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage in December of 2013 by her pimp and one or more of his associates. The Backpage solicitations for the underage
Jane Doe No. 3 described her as “new,” “sweet,” and
“playful.” As with the other Jane Does, the ads were
paid for with a prepaid credit card. Jane Doe No. 3 was
also given a mobile phone to take calls and texts from
customers. She was taken to a hotel in Foxborough,
Massachusetts, where she was raped by men who responded to the ads. Photos of Jane Doe No. 3, including
one that she had taken of herself, appeared with the ads
13
on Backpage.
13

At some point, Jane Doe No. 3’s parents became aware of the ads
featuring their daughter on Backpage and demanded that they be
taken down. A week later, the illicit ads still appeared on the website.
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The Doe plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in October
of 2014. In their Second Amended Complaint, they allege that defendants’ business practices violate the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50
(Count II); and constitute unfair and deceptive business
practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 (Count III). The
Doe plaintiffs also bring claims for unauthorized use of
pictures of a person, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 214, § 3A and
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 (Count IV), and copyright infringement (specific to the photograph taken by Jane
Doe No. 3 of herself) (Count V). In January of 2015, defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The parties
and several amici curiae14 filed helpful briefs. The court
heard oral argument on April 15, 2015.
DISCUSSION
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
factual allegations of a complaint must “possess enough
heft” to set forth “a plausible entitlement to relief.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 559
(2007); see also Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944,
14

The City and County of San Francisco, the City of Atlanta, the
City and County of Denver, the City of Houston, the City of Philadelphia, and the City of Portland (Oregon) (collectively the local
government amici) and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted two amicus briefs in support of plaintiffs. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy & Technology,
and Professor Eric Goldman (of Santa Clara University School of
Law) (collectively EFF) submitted an amicus brief in support of
defendants.
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948 (1st Cir. 2008). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, this standard “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
A
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants rely primarily on the immunity provided by Congress in enacting 47 U.S.C. § 230, that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider,” id. § 230(c)(1), and the concomitant preemption of “cause[s] of action . . . brought . . . under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
Id. § 230(e)(3).15 There is no dispute that defendants
are, as the operators of Backpage, providers of an interactive computer service. Defendants contend that
because the Doe plaintiffs allege they were harmed by
the contents of postings that defendants had no part in
15

The Doe plaintiffs argue that the court should first assess the
plausibility and sufficiency of the factual allegations relevant to
each claim before reaching the immunity issue. However, the entitlement to immunity under section 230 is not only an affirmative
defense, but also the right to be immune from being sued. See, e.g.,
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2003); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “can [] support a motion to dismiss if the
statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”);
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015)
(same). As the Supreme Court counsels, a claim of entitlement to
immunity should be “resolv[ed] . . . at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
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creating, the claims fall squarely within Congress’s exemption of interactive computer service providers from
liability for third-party Internet content.
Congress enacted section 230 in 1996, while the Internet was still in its infancy. Congress explained the
purposes of the law in five pertinent findings:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational
and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great
degree of control over the information
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive
computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive
computer services have flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying
on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
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47 U.S.C. § 230(a). Consistent with these findings, section 230 reflects the “policy of the United States”
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received
by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive
computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
online material; and
(5)
to ensure vigorous enforcement
of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassment by means of computer.
Id. § 230(b).
The Doe plaintiffs argue that because the Internet
has matured since the enactment of section 230, the
principal policy consideration that animated Congress
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(promoting the growth of the Internet by insulating it
from regulatory restrictions and lawsuits) no longer has
the assuasive force that it may once have had. They
cite the characterization of section 230’s immunity
guarantee as an affirmative defense in cases like
Klayman and Ricci as evidence that the courts have
been whittling back the scope of section 230 immunity
as the Internet has shed its training wheels. See
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28. The
argument, however, does not bear scrutiny. Both the
Klayman and Ricci courts, whatever the label they
used to describe section 230’s effect, found the interactive computer service providers at issue to be immune
from any imputation of liability for third-party speech.
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1359; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 2728. Moreover, Congress, far from lowering the immunity bar, ratcheted it up in 2010 by expanding the scope
of section 230 immunity to preempt the enforcement of
inconsistent foreign judgments.
See 28 U.S.C. §
16
4102(c)(1).
The local government amici attempt to repackage
Backpage as an “information content provider,” an entity that section 230 defines as “any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47
16

Section 4102(c)(1) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an interactive computer service, as defined in section 230
of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the domestic court determines that the judgment would be consistent
with section 230 if the information that is the subject of such
judgment had been provided in the United States.”
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U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Their ultimate point is that information content providers are excluded from the immunity granted by section 230. The amici contend that
Backpage generates content by: (1) posting illegal materials in sponsored ads; (2) stripping metadata from
posted photos; (3) coaching the crafting of ads by allowing misspellings of suggestive terms; and (4) designing
the escorts section of the website in such a way as to
signal to readers that sex with children is sold here.
The amici argument relies heavily on Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Ninth
Circuit determined Roommates.com, a roommate
matching service, to be an “information content provider” shorn of section 230 immunity because it elicited
information about personal characteristics of users that
is forbidden by the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1169-1170.
The Court reasoned that
Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is direct and
palpable:
Roommate designed its
search and email systems to limit the
listings available to subscribers based
on sex, sexual orientation and presence
of children. Roommate selected the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils
allege that the act of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair
Housing Act, which prohibits brokers
from steering clients in accordance with
discriminatory preferences.
Id.
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To get to its result, the Court in Roommates attempted to draw a line between active control of the
content of a web posting and the provision of a neutral
interactive service that simply replicates offending
third-party matter.17
If an individual uses an ordinary search
engine to query for a “white roommate,”
the search engine has not contributed to
any alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing neutral tools to
carry out what may be unlawful or illicit
searches does not amount to “development” for purposes of the immunity exception. . . . Similarly, a housing website
that allows users to specify whether
they will or will not receive emails by
means of user-defined criteria might
help some users exclude email from other users of a particular race or sex.
However, that website would be immune, so long as it does not require the
use of discriminatory criteria. A website operator who edits user-created
content – such as by correcting spelling,
removing obscenity or trimming for
length – retains his immunity for any illegality in the user-created content,
provided that the edits are unrelated to
the illegality.
17

Roommates is one of the few sentinels denying section 230 immunity left standing among some 300 cases (as of 2012) that have
decided the issue. See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227,
239 (2012).
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Id. at 1169 (bold emphasis added). This latter passage
lays out the distinction that afforded immunity to
craigslist.com, an online classifieds forum that also published discriminatory housing ads. “Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination;
for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to
people who include discriminatory statements in their
postings.” Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671672 (7th Cir. 2008).
Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid
practices of Backpage identified by amici amount to
neither affirmative participation in an illegal venture
nor active web content creation. Nothing in the escorts
section of Backpage requires users to offer or search
for commercial sex with children. The existence of an
escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its
social merits, is not illegal. The creation of sponsored
ads with excerpts taken from the original posts reflects
the illegality (or legality) of the original posts and nothing more. Similarly, the automatic generation of navigational path names that identify the ads as falling
within the “escorts” category is not content creation.
See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 1456316, at *5-6 (D.
Ariz. April 15, 2014). The stripping of metadata from
photographs is a standard practice among Internet service providers. Hosting anonymous users and accepting payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins,
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made illegal by Congress, but it was not. Backpage’s passivity
and imperfect filtering system may be appropriate targets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage
into an information content provider.
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Although the Doe plaintiffs recognize that defendants did not author the content of the offending ads, see
Opp’n at 16 (“Plaintiffs’ trafficking claims do not seek to
‘impute’ to [d]efendants any advertisements created by
others”), they challenge the breadth of the immunity
sought by defendants. Count I alleges a violation of a
section of the TVPRA, a federal statute that criminalizes sex trafficking. As the Doe plaintiffs note, section
230 expressly states that “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223
or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or
110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title
18, or any other Federal criminal statute.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(e)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ business practices, “even if the advertisements had never been posted,” Opp’n at 16, are sufficient to make out a violation of the TVPRA. Furthermore, according to the Doe plaintiffs, section 230 only
immunizes “action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis
added). The Doe plaintiffs argue that their claims are
of a different sort – they allege that defendants have
intentionally and in bad faith hidden behind ineffectual
counter-trafficking measures to deflect the scrutiny of
law enforcement and social services agencies. Count II
alleges a violation of the MATA, the Massachusetts analog to the TVPRA. The Doe plaintiffs argue that, because claims under the TVPRA are exempt from the
scope of section 230’s immunity, the claim under MATA
does not depend on “inconsistent state law” preempted
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by section 230. Count III, which presses a claim of unfair and deceptive businesses practices under Massachusetts law, is alleged to arise not from the posted ads
and their contents, but from the architecture of Backpage itself, which the Doe plaintiffs contend is constructed to conceal illegal activity from law enforcement. Finally, the Doe plaintiffs rely on Congress’s
stricture that section 230 “shall not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property,” id. § 230(e)(2), as preserving the intellectual property claims (unauthorized publicity and copyright infringement).18 I will examine the viability of each count
in turn.
Civil Remedy under the TVPRA
18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides victims of trafficking the
right to bring a private civil action for restitution
against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.” The parties dispute whether a civil action authorized by a criminal statute can be construed as “enforcement of . . . a
Federal criminal statute” exempt from the immunity
19
provided by section 230(e)(1).

18

Defendants do not rely on section 230 immunity with respect to
the copyright infringement claim, but contend, to be discussed infra, that it should be dismissed on other grounds.

19

The Doe plaintiffs, citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th
Cir. 2009), also contend that their TVPRA claim falls outside of the
protections of section 230 immunity because section 1595 imposes a
duty of care on defendants wholly independent of their role as publishers of speech. In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred a negligent
undertaking claim under Oregon law that sought to hold Yahoo
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The Doe plaintiffs maintain that the statutory language, “enforce[ing] . . . a Federal criminal statute,”
implies more than a dependence on criminal prosecution alone. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(to “enforce” is “[t]o give force or effect to” or
“[l]oosely, to compel a person to pay damages for not
complying with . . . .”). Further, plaintiffs contend that
civil actions are frequently authorized as part and parcel of the enforcement regime behind criminal statutes.
See Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712,
719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ivil enforcement mechanisms []
permit private parties to sue to enforce statutory prohibitions.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs also rely on
liable for an alleged failure to remove indecent profiles of a plaintiff that had been posted by her ex-boyfriend because the claim
attempted to impose publisher liability on Yahoo for content created by a third party. Id. at 1102-1105 (“The word ‘undertaking,’
after all, is meaningless without the following verb. That is, one
does not merely undertake; one undertakes to do something. And
what is the undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform with due care? The removal of the indecent profiles that her
former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website. But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis
of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a
publisher of the content it failed to remove.”).
The Court did, however, allow a claim of promissory estoppel to
stand on the allegation that a Director of Communications at Yahoo had contacted plaintiff and promised to remove the offending
ads, but failed to do so in a timely manner. Id. at 1107-1109. “Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to
do something, which happens to be removal of material from publication.” Id. at 1107. There is no claim by the Doe plaintiffs that
any such assurance was given to them by Backpage. As Barnes
illustrates, the existence of a statutory remedy without more does
not give rise mirabile dictu to a tort duty. If it did, there would no
need to create such a remedy in the first place.
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dicta in Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931,
at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), surmising that section 230
“arguably . . . may not be used to bar a civil RICO claim
because that would impair the enforcement of a Federal criminal statute.”
Defendants, for their part, point out that courts
have consistently rejected this argument in a section
230 immunity context. In Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL
3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court held that
Yahoo could not be held civilly liable for allegedly
knowingly hosting child pornography on a user site
styled as the Candyman e-group. The Magistrate
Judge examined “th[is] issue of first impression” in
scholarly detail that is worth quoting at length. Id., at
*3.
The plain text of the statute establishes
that the 230(e)(1) exception does not encompass private civil claims. As argued
by Defendant, the common definition of
the term “criminal,” as well as its use in
the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically excludes and is distinguished from
civil claims. The term “criminal” is defined as “[c]onnected with the administration of penal justice.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 302; see also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 430 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “criminal” as “[r]elating to the administration
of penal law”). The term “civil” is defined as follows: “[o]f or relating to private rights and remedies that are
sought by action or suit, as distinct from
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criminal proceedings.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 262 (emphasis added). In
addition, Congress’ use of the word “enforcement” in Section 230(e)(1) again
confirms that the exception refers to
governmental action, not civil actions by
a private litigant.
Congress did not bifurcate any statutes
as asserted by Plaintiffs. Rather, as
noted by Defendant, it preserved the
ability of law enforcement officials to enforce the federal criminal laws to their
fullest extent while at the same time
eliminating the ability of private plaintiffs to pursue service-provider defendants. Given the complexity of Title 18
and the availability of civil remedies in
statutes throughout the criminal code,
Congress achieved its intended result
using simple language making it clear
that Section 230’s limits on civil liability
would not affect governmental enforcement of federal criminal laws.
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ invocation of Section 230(e)(1) rests on their
generalized policy arguments rather
than the text of the statute. Plaintiffs’
core argument appears to be that Section 230(e)(1) must exempt civil claims
under the child pornography statutes
because child pornography is “not to be
tolerated” and “[i]f the prospect of civil
liability provides a disincentive for en-
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gaging in child pornography over and
above that provided by the prospect of
fines and jail time, then that is a good
thing.”
Child pornography obviously is intolerable, but civil immunity for interactive
service providers does not constitute
“tolerance” of child pornography any
more than civil immunity from the numerous other forms of harmful content
that third parties may create constitutes
approval of that content. Section 230
does not limit anyone’s ability to bring
criminal or civil actions against the actual wrongdoers, the individuals who actually create and consume the child pornography. Here, both the neighbor
[who created the child pornography] and
the moderator of the Candyman web
site have been prosecuted and are serving sentences in federal prison. Further, the section 230(e)(1) exemption
permits law enforcement authorities to
bring criminal charges against even interactive service providers in the event
that they themselves actually violate
federal criminal laws.
Regarding civil liability, however, Congress decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based on their
own beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal laws. As Defendant explained in its briefing, the
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reason is evident. If civil liability were
possible, the incentive to bring a civil
claim for the settlement value could be
immense, even if a plaintiff’s claim was
without merit. Even if it ultimately
prevailed, the service provider would
face intense public scrutiny and substantial expense. Given the millions of
communications that a service provider
such as Defendant enables, the service
provider could find itself a defendant in
numerous such cases. Congress determined that it wanted to eliminate the
resulting disincentives to the development of vibrant and diverse services involving third-party communication,
while maintaining the ability of criminal
prosecutions by the government for violations of federal criminal law. In sum,
Congress did intend to treat civil and
criminal claims differently and carefully
crafted Section 230(e)(1) to achieve exactly that result. Plaintiffs’ claim, although novel, is untenable and without
merit.
Id., at *21-22.
The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
opinion, also noting that
[t]he legislative history [] buttresses the
Congressional policy against civil liability for internet service providers. One
key proponent of an amendment containing the language of § 230 at issue
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explained that “the existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for
the people who might best help us control the Internet to do so.” 141 Cong.
Rec. H8469. Several legislators identified “obscenity” in particular as material
that could be more freely regulated as a
result of the immunity provided by the
statute. Another proponent noted that
“[t]here is no way that any of [the internet service providers], like Prodigy, can
take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in to
them from all manner of sources onto
their bulletin board. . . . We are talking
about . . . thousands of pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is wrong.” Id.
at H8471. The House approved the
amendment by a vote of 410 to 4. Id. at
H8478.
Id., at *4. The court concluded that on the basis of this
legislative history, “Congress decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own
beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the
criminal laws.” Id., at *5.
In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings,
LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court
adopted the reasoning of Bates and rejected the identical argument from plaintiff, a victim of child sex trafficking, that section 230 carved out an exemption for
the civil claim that she had brought against Backpage
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Id. at 1055-1056. Similarly, in
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Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31,
2014), the court rejected plaintiff’s effort to claim private redress for defendants’ alleged criminal conspiracy
to violate his rights. Id., at *8. “Even if Plaintiff had
alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA exception for federal criminal statutes applies to government
prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action under
stat[utes] with criminal aspects.” Id.
Although the Doe plaintiffs challenge this line of
cases as “flawed,” the court is persuaded that criminal
and civil actions differ in kind and that section 230 exempts only criminal prosecutions. Section 1595 itself
recognizes that although a private right of action may
be complementary to government interests in combating trafficking, a civil action primarily vindicates private interests and must take a back seat to a criminal
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (“Any civil action filed under this section shall be stayed during the
pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same
occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.”). The
court also finds persuasive amici EFF’s argument that
only criminal prosecutions are exempted from section
230’s immunity because they are subject to the filter of
prosecutorial discretion and a heightened standard of
proof, making them less likely to have a chilling effect
20
on the freedom of online speech.

20

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs fail to make out a case
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 because they do not allege that defendants
shared the traffickers’ criminal intent. Plaintiffs counter that section 1595 imposes liability not only for aiding and abetting, but
more broadly for “participation in a venture which that person
knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of
this chapter.” Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). The court need not
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The Doe plaintiffs’ next argument, that section 230
only immunizes “good faith” efforts to restrict access to
offensive materials, has also failed to find support in the
decided cases. Section 203(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”
Section 230(c)(2) further provides that
[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on
account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider
or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or
make available to information content
providers or others the technical means
to restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1).
Where section 230(c)(1) exempts an interactive
service provider from liability for publishing thirdparty content, section 230(c)(2) also immunizes these
providers from liability for actions taken in good faith
to restrict offensive content.

decide this issue because it holds that this claim is preempted by
section 230 immunity.
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[Section] 230(c)(1) contains no explicit
exception for impermissible editorial
motive, whereas § 230(c)(2) does contain
a “good faith” requirement for the immunity provided therein.
That §
230(c)(2) expressly provides for a good
faith element omitted from § 230(c)(1)
indicates that Congress intended not to
import a subjective intent/good faith
limitation into § 230(c)(1). “[W]here
Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in
another . . . , it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”
Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 [] (1993). Accordingly, the text of the two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s
immunity applies regardless of whether
the publisher acts in good faith.
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).21
Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices
The Doe plaintiffs contend that the claim for unfair
and deceptive business practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 9,
survives section 230 immunity because it does not de21

Because the CDA immunizes Backpage from private litigants
seeking redress under civil law, the parallel state law claim under
the MATA is necessarily inconsistent with, and therefore
preempted by, the CDA.
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pend on the content of the advertisements themselves,
but rather on the “deceptive” design of Backpage.
Without the offending ads, however, no nexus would
exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the
Doe plaintiffs. Their theory – that absent the permissive website design and imperfect filtering, their pimps
would not have trafficked them or, if they had attempted to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized
Backpage more closely and would possibly have intervened to prevent their injuries – is too speculative to
fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably foreseeability.
Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this
“entire website” theory as inconsistent with the substance and policy of section 230.
In Universal
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.
2007), the First Circuit refused to hold Lycos (a search
engine) liable for the “construct and operation” of its
website. Id. at 422. “Lycos’s decision not to reduce
misinformation by changing its web site policies was as
much an editorial decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a particular posting. Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form
that decision takes.” Id.; see also StubHub, Inc., 219
N.C. App. at 245 (rejecting the “entire website” approach in determining whether the Internet ticket
marketplace may be held responsible for scalpers’ unfair or deceptive trade practices); Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257
(4th Cir. 2009) (finding a “structure and design” approach inapplicable where, unlike in Roommates, the
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design of website did not “require[] users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use.”).22
Also problematic is the suggestion that either
knowledge or tacit encouragement of illegal content
(but not the content itself) can be the basis for interactive web services liability. “It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service
provider’s own speech.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir.
1997) (“The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher to a distributor in
the eyes of the law.”). Moreover,
there is simply no authority for the
proposition that [encouraging the
publication of defamatory content]
makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for
the ‘creation or development’ of
every post on the site. . . . Unless
Congress amends the [CDA], it is
legally (although perhaps not ethically) beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the ma-

22

Court have also rejected consumer protection claims under section 230(c)(1) that seek to hold interactive service providers liable
for third-party content. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-422 (Florida securities and cyberstalking laws); Hinton v. Amazon.com,
2014 WL 6982628, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 9, 2014) (Mississippi Consumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL 3778261, at *1 (New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard v. Google, 2008 WL 5245490,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (California Unfair Competition
Law).
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terial, or how they might use it to
their advantage.
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450,
476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted,
ellipsis in original). Indeed,
an encouragement test would inflate the
meaning of “development” to the point
of eclipsing the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress established.
Many websites not only allow but also
actively invite and encourage users to
post particular types of content. Some
of this content will be unwelcome to
others – e.g., unfavorable reviews of
consumer products and services, allegations of price gouging, complaints of
fraud on consumers, reports of bed bugs,
collections of cease-and-desist notices
relating to online speech. And much of
this content is commented upon by the
website operators who make the forum
available. Indeed, much of it is “adopted” by website operators, gathered into
reports, and republished online. Under
an encouragement test of development,
these websites would lose the immunity
under the CDA and be subject to hecklers’ suits aimed at the publisher.
Moreover, under the district court’s
rule, courts would then have to decide
what constitutes “encouragement” in
order to determine immunity under the
CDA – a concept that is certainly more
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difficult to define and apply than the
Ninth Circuit’s material contribution
test. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. Congress envisioned an uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open internet, see § 230(a)(1)(5), but the muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud that vision. Accordingly, other courts have declined to
hold that websites were not entitled to
the immunity furnished by the CDA because they selected and edited content
for display, thereby encouraging the
posting of similar content.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 414-415 (6th Cir. 2014).23
Right of Publicity
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, provides
that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait or
picture is used within the commonwealth for advertising purposes or for
the purposes of trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in
the superior court against the person so
using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof;
23

Defendants also argue that the Chapter 93A claim, in so far as it
is based on alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement and
social services agencies, lacks an essential foundational element
because law enforcement and social services agencies have no connection in a commercial context to defendants as “consumers” of
goods and services.
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and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 provides in almost identical
language that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait, or
picture is used within the state for
commercial purposes without his or her
written consent may bring an action in
the superior court against the person so
using his or her name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain the use
thereof, and may recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such
use.
Accepting, dubitante, the Doe plaintiffs’ assertion that
the right to publicity constitutes an intellectual property claim exempt from immunity under section 230,24 the
24

Although certain publicity rights are akin to “intellectual property” rights, a person’s image is not a “product of the human intellect.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). “[T]he right of publicity flows from the right to privacy,” Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano
Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 (D.P.R. 2001) (citing numerous
cases), which is an intangible right of a different nature. Despite
the Doe plaintiffs’ attorney’s contention at oral argument that a
photograph may be copyrightable, it does not follow that the underlying image is ipso facto protectable under intellectual property law. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,
528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Recognizing that Oscar
Wilde’s inimitable visage does not belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to
any photographer, the Supreme Court noted that photographs
may well sometimes lack originality and are thus not per se copyrightable. . . . [P]hotographs are copyrightable, if only to the extent of their original depiction of the subject. Wilde’s image is not
copyrightable; but to the extent a photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions regarding pose, positioning, background, light-
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court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs have not
pled plausible claims for unauthorized use of their images. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants used their
images to extract any direct benefit (such as featuring
plaintiffs on advertisements for Backpage). Rather, the
allegation is that defendants benefitted incidentally
from the fee charged for posting advertisements with
the Doe plaintiffs’ pictures in the escorts section of the
website. The argument, however, has been explicitly
rejected by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.25
[T]the crucial distinction under G.L. c.
214, s 3A, must be between situations in
which the defendant makes an incidental
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or
picture and those in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or

ing, shading, and the like, those elements can be said to ‘owe their
origins’ to the photographer, making the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.”), citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). Courts also disagree as to whether state law intellectual property claims are exempted under section 230. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102,
1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In the absence of a definition from Congress,
we construe the term “intellectual property” to mean ‘federal intellectual property.’”) with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540
F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (“[Section] 230(e)(2) applies
simply to ‘any law pertaining to intellectual property,’ not just federal law.”).
25

“[A]s a federal court considering state law claims, we must apply
the state’s law on substantive issues and ‘we are bound by the
teachings of the state’s highest court.’” Phoung Luc v. Wyndham
Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2007), citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2001).
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picture deliberately to exploit its value
for advertising or trade purposes.
Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749
(1980). “‘The fact that the defendant is engaged in the
business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out
of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not
enough to make the incidental publication a commercial
use of the name or likeness.’” Id., quoting Nelson v.
Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (in turn
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d
(1977)); see also Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv.
Employees Int’l Union, 62 F. Supp. 2d 483, 506 (D.R.I.
1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
remanded sub nom. Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254,
Serv. Employees Int’l Union AFL-CIO, 241 F.3d 82
(1st Cir. 2001) (“The Rhode Island legislature borrowed
the Privacy Act’s scheme of four privacy torts, including the tort of false light, from the doctrine of privacy
torts promulgated by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479 (D.R.I.
1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-E (establishing the four privacy torts). Accordingly, Rhode Island courts have often turned to the Restatement as an
authority on the matter of privacy torts.”).
Copyright Infringement
Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registration for her photograph on December 18, 2014, after this lawsuit was
filed. Although registration is not a jurisdictional prerequisite of bringing a suit for copyright infringement,
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166
(2010), it is a “condition precedent for obtaining certain
remedies, such as statutory damages and attorneys’
fees.” Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.
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2005); see also 17 U.S.C § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory
damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be made for – (1)
any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work
commenced before the effective date of its registration.”).
The only recovery remaining open to Jane Doe No.
3 is compensatory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. Section 504 permits recovery of “the actual damages suffered by [] her as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages.” With respect to the latter, Jane
Doe No. 3 alleges that “[t]he Backpage Defendants derive a financial benefit directly attributable to the public display of such photographs by virtue of the payment of fees by the pimps and traffickers to Backpage.com.” SAC ¶ 139. However, she may only recover profits from defendants that are causally linked to
specific acts of infringement. See On Davis v. The Gap,
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159-161 (2d Cir. 2001). Here no plausible link exists between defendants’ generalized profits and any common-law copyright vesting in Jane Doe
No. 3’s photo for the simple reason that the fee for posting an ad is the same whether or not it includes a photograph. Jane Doe No. 3 does not allege that she suffered any loss of revenues or licensing fees for her photo as a result of the infringement (nor does she allege
that the protectable elements of the photo, see n.12 supra, have any market value).
Because she does not plead any redressable damages, Jane Doe No. 3’s copyright infringement claim
must also be dismissed.
***
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To avoid any misunderstanding, let me make it
clear that the court is not unsympathetic to the tragic
plight described by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and
Jane Doe No. 3. Nor does it regard the sexual trafficking of children as anything other than an abhorrent
evil. Finally, the court is not naïve – I am fully aware
that sex traffickers and other purveyors of illegal
wares ranging from drugs to pornography exploit the
vulnerabilities of the Internet as a marketing tool.
Whether one agrees with its stated policy or not (a policy driven not simply by economic concerns, but also by
technological and constitutional considerations), Congress has made the determination that the balance between suppression of trafficking and freedom of expression should be struck in favor of the latter in so far
as the Internet is concerned. Putting aside the moral
judgment that one might pass on Backpage’s business
practices, this court has no choice but to adhere to the
law that Congress has seen fit to enact.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is ALLOWED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1724
JANE DOE (1); JANE DOE (2); JANE DOE (3), A
MINOR CHILD, BY HER PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIENDS, SAM LOE AND SARA LOE
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC; CAMARILLO HOLDINGS,
LLC, f/k/a Village Voice Media Holding, LLC; NEW
TIMES MEDIA, LLC
Defendants – Appellees
___________
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
Torruella, Selya, Lynch, Thompson,
Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
___________
ORDER OF COURT
___________
Entered: May 3, 2016
Pursuant to First Circuit Internal Operating Procedure X(C), the petition for rehearing en banc has also
*

Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
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been treated as a petition for rehearing before the original panel. The petition for rehearing having been denied by the panel of judges who decided the case, and
the petition for rehearing en banc having been submitted to the active judges of this court and a majority of
the judges not having voted that the case be heard en
banc, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing and
petition for rehearing en banc be denied.
By the Court:
/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk
cc:
John T. Montgomery
Dara Ann Reppucci
Ching-Lee Fukuda
Aaron M. Katz
Christine Ezzell Singer
Jessica Lucia Soto
Rebecca C. Ellis
Robert A. Bertsche
Jeffrey J. Pyle
James C. Grant
Ambika Kumar Doran
Genevieve C. Nadeau
Mark David Lipton
Stacey J. Rappaport
Michael A. Rogoff
Jenna A. Hudson

70a
APPENDIX D
18 U.S.C. § 1591
§ 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or
coercion
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains,
patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph
(1), knowing, or, except where the act constituting
the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force,
threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial
sex act, or that the person has not attained the age
of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a)
is—
(1) if the offense was effected by means of force,
threats of force, fraud, or coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or by any combination of such means,
or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised, patronized,
or solicited had not attained the age of 14 years at
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the time of such offense, by a fine under this title
and imprisonment for any term of years not less
than 15 or for life; or
(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided,
obtained, advertised, patronized, or solicited had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the
age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine
under this title and imprisonment for not less than
10 years or for life.
(c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited,
the Government need not prove that the defendant
knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.
(d) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any
way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this
section, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a
term not to exceed 20 years, or both.
(e) In this section:
(1) The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or
legal process” means the use or threatened use of a
law or legal process, whether administrative, civil,
or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for
which the law was not designed, in order to exert
pressure on another person to cause that person to
take some action or refrain from taking some action.
(2) The term “coercion” means—
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(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person;
(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to
cause a person to believe that failure to perform
an act would result in serious harm to or physical
restraint against any person; or
(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the
legal process.
(3) The term “commercial sex act” means any sex
act, on account of which anything of value is given to
or received by any person.
(4) The term “serious harm” means any harm,
whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual
activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.
(5) The term “venture” means any group of two or
more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a
legal entity.
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APPENDIX E
18 U.S.C. § 1595
§ 1595. Civil remedy
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this
chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator
(or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may
recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
(b)(1) Any civil action filed under this section shall be
stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is
the victim.
(2) In this subsection, a ‘‘criminal action’’ includes
investigation and prosecution and is pending until
final adjudication in the trial court.
(c) No action may be maintained under this section unless it is commenced not later than 10 years after the
cause of action arose.
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APPENDIX F
47 U.S.C. § 230
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of
offensive material
(a) Findings The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and
other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of
control over the information that they receive, as
well as the potential for even greater control in the
future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services
and other interactive media;
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(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information
is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5)
to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene,
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lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others
the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).[1]
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the
time of entering an agreement with a customer for the
provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such
customer that parental control protections (such as
computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are
commercially available that may assist the customer in
limiting access to material that is harmful to minors.
Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with
access to information identifying, current providers of
such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair
the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title,
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any
other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
the application of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made
by such Act, or any similar State law.
(f) Definitions As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term “interactive computer service” means any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to
the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
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(4) Access software provider The term “access
software provider” means a provider of software
(including client or server software), or enabling
tools that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache,
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
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APPENDIX G
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50
§ 50. Trafficking of persons for sexual servitude; trafficking of persons under 18 years for sexual servitude;
trafficking by business entities; penalties; tort actions
brought by victims
(a) Whoever knowingly: (i) subjects, or attempts to subject, or recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides
or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice,
harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any means, another person to engage in commercial sexual activity, a
sexually-explicit performance or the production of unlawful pornography in violation of chapter 272, or causes a person to engage in commercial sexual activity, a
sexually-explicit performance or the production of unlawful pornography in violation of said chapter 272; or
(ii) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, as a result of a violation of clause (i), shall be guilty
of the crime of trafficking of persons for sexual servitude and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for not less than 5 years but not more than
20 years and by a fine of not more than $25,000. Such
sentence shall not be reduced to less than 5 years, or
suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this
section be eligible for probation, parole, work release or
furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for
good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such
sentence. No prosecution commenced under this section
shall be continued without a finding or placed on file.
(b) Whoever commits the crime of trafficking of persons for sexual servitude upon a person under 18 years
of age shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for life or for any term of years, but not less than
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5 years. No person convicted under this subsection
shall be eligible for probation, parole, work release or
furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for
good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such
sentence.
(c) A business entity that commits trafficking of persons for sexual servitude shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $1,000,000.
(d) A victim of subsection (a) may bring an action in
tort in the superior court in any county wherein a violation of subsection (a) occurred, where the plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or has a place of
business. Any business entity that knowingly aids or is
a joint venturer in trafficking of persons for sexual servitude shall be civilly liable for an offense under this
section.

